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The verb "renegotiate" as defined by Webster's New
Collegiate Dicti onary means "to readjust (a government war
contract or subcontract or the price stipulated) by negotiation
with a price-adjustment board charged (under section ^-03 of
Public Lav; 528, ?7th Congress) with elimination of any excessive
profits made out of the war."
The process of renegotiation and the federal agency
known as the Renegotiation Board are the subjects of this paper.
Renegotiation is one of the most; controversial aspects of
defense procurement today, and the opposing factions are well
defined---on the proponent side is the administration and the
Renegotiation Board, and on the opponent side are the various
lobbies of the defense manufacturers.
Renegotiation is important because present-day military
procurement involves an outlay of some $^0 billion annually, and
the efficient use of these funds is, or should be, of prime
interest to the Department of Defense, Congress, and the tax-
payer. Renegotiation, as carried out by the Renegotiation
Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), consists of an
after-the-fact examination of a contractors profits and





performance on all his renegotiable business for a fiscal year.
Thus, the examination contributes in some measure to the
efficient use of funds by providing for the recapturing of any
excessive profits from the contractor. The Board does not
directly audit the procurement policies of the various compo-
nents of the Department of Defense as does the General Accounting
Office, but rather has the specific function to review a con-
tractor's entire defense business for a particular fiscal year,
regardless of whether or not the profits on the individual con-
tracts were excessive. In other words, the Board is interested
in the aggregate, not the details.
The author's primary purpose in writing this paper was
to show that the complex, secretive, and controversial process
of renegotiation does have an impact on national defense procure-
ment, and that ii; is important to all concerned with renegotia-
tion that they study the process and try to determine if and how
it should be changed.
To carry out the stated purpose, the paper encompasses
the following areas: (1) the background and evolution of renego-
tiation, covering the profit controls of World War I through to
the Renegotiation Act of 1951. (2) the World War II experience
with renegotiation as a fledgling process, (3) the operations
and procedures of the Renegotiation Board, (*0 the major prob-
lems connected with renegotiation, and (5) the principle argu-
ments for and against renegotiation, including a discussion of
the 1962 Truth, in Negotiations Act.
It was not the author's intent to exhaustively study or
discuss any one particular aspect or problem of renegotiation;
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rather, the intent was to present a survey or overview of the
entire sphere of renegotiation and to let the reader form hj s
ovm judgment as to the usefulness or validity of renegotiation.
Methodology and Organizati on
The bulk of the paper was written through the use of
source materials from various libraries in the Washington, D.C.
area. The Renegotiation Board library and the Library of Con-
gress were most helpful in this respect. Most of the literature
on renegotiation has been published in the form of Congressional
hearings and reports and as articles In the various business and
professional periodicals. There are, however, some books that
have dealt with the subject. The most recent and one of the
best is Procurement and Profit Renegotiation, edited by J. Fred
Weston. The book was not written from one man's point of view,
but rather was a collection of various articles and papers on
the general subject of renegotiation. Because of this diversity
of opinion, the book was very helpful in the preparation of the
latter chapters of this paper.
Other excellent source material came from the various
Congressional hearings that have been held on renegotiation and
from the study done by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation. Since most of the hearings contain basically the same
points of view, the principle ones used were those held by the
House Committee on Ways and Means in 1959 arid in 1968.
Material for the chapters concerning the actual proce-
dures of renegotiation came mostly from publications of the




The paper J. s divided into six chapters of which this
introduction is the first. Chapter II presents a broad review
of the history of profit limitation and renegotiation from 1915
to 1951* Chapter III examines the process of renegotiation and
the operations and organization of the Renegotiation Board.
Chapter IV identifies some of the difficulties associated with
renegotiation, and Chapter V outlines some of the changes that
have been proposed to the process. Chapter VI closes the





HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF RENEGOTIATION
Pre-19^2
World War I
The entry of the United States into World War I
occasioned the greatest industrial build-up in our history.
It was a build-up that was partially prepared for in advance
in that for the first year of the war, the country was a
large-scale supplier of raw materials and industrial products
to the allies, and as such some industries had adapted for
and were geared to war production Also, the country, because
of its neutral position, was able to observe the burdens that
war production placed on the industrial sectors of other
countries. However, even with this advance knowledge and
preparation, the first four months of the American war effort
have been characterized as generally chaotic, principally due
to the fact that there was no organized governmental agency
to assume control over industries.
This control was seen as necessary, according to
Adams, because
Comparatively few individuals at the time had any
clear insight into the need for centralized, coordinated,
and maximized Industrial output, the efficient and prompt
diversion of this output to military purposes (in the
broadest sense), the restrict:! on of unnecessary produc-




which had become acute by 1916. and--above all--the
means by which all this was to be achieved.
1
Seven months prior to the United States' entrance into
the hostilities there was established a Council of National
Defense which was to be responsible for the "coordination of
industries and resources for the national security and
welfare" and the "creation of relations which will render
possible in time of need the immediate concentration and
2
utilization of the resources of the nation." An Advisory
Commission was also appointed, each member of which was to be
an expert in some field of industry, thereby paving the way
for the establishment of committees of industry with which
the government could negotiate purchase prices of various raw
materials.
Neither the Council of National Defense nor the
various agencies spawned by it were able to exert a broad
enough control over industry to insure its "orderly, prompt
and efficient mobilization." To try to alleviate this
problem, there was created on July 28, 1917. "by the Council,
with President Wilson* s approval, a War Industries Board, the
basic function of which was to "act as a clearing house for
the war-industry needs of the Federal Government . . . and
3
consider price factors. "^
But neither was the War Industries Board able to solve
George P. Adams, Jr., Wartime Price Control (Washing-












the ever-increasing problem of coordination of industrial
expansion, and so on March ^, 1918, the pov,Ters of the Board
were expanded and a Chairman, Bernard M. Baruch, was
appointed by the President. To broaden the function of price
control, Baruch immediately set up a Price Fixing Committee,
the main purpose of which was to "advise upon prices of basic
materials." This Committee, although created by the War
Industries Board, reported directly to the President and was
therefore regarded as independent of the Board.
I The Price Fixing Committee was not given blanket
authority by Congress to issue price regulations pertaining to
broad classes of products, but instead had to go about it in a
piecemeal, commodity-by-commodity fashion. Baruch, in his
book, American Industry in th e War, said that most of the price
fixing was J: duiiu by negotiation and agreement between the
2Government and the trades." Thus appeared the principle of
negotiation of contracts, a principle which was to come into
prominence in V/orld War II and which was to lead to the
principle of renegotiation.
One of the primary reasons that price control was
needed during the war was the inflationary temperament of the
economy. There exists in the literature of World War I several




2Bernard M. Baruch, American Industry in the 'War (New





scope of this paper to explore it. Generally it may be said,
however, that during the period 1913-1918, prices on most
commodities rose to a level higher than in any other period
in our history, and that these prices were passed on not only
to the government, but also to the individual consumer, thereby
raising his cost of living. With the price rise, moreover,
also came a wage increase, which added another element to the
inflationary spiral in which the economy was engaged.
The purpose of government control of prices during the
war was not primarily to insure low prices, but rather "to
bring as nearly as possible to reality that ideal condition in
which the country as one man would be bending its energies to
the satisfaction of the all-impelling war needs."" The
officials in Washington knew that prices could not arbitrariDy
be set at tuo low a figure because the stimulation of
production in many essential industries would then be lacking.
It was also fairly well recognized that even with granting the
businessmen the highest qualities of patriotism, the "vision of
fair reward" was the most stimulating factor to wartime
production. On the other hand, profits earned by manufacturers
were not looked on with great favor by many people in the
country, especially those. who had relatives in the armed
forces. The Committee's difficult task, then, was to strike an
See, for example, Adams, Wartime Price Control
,
pp. 1^-23; Baruch, American Industry'
, pp. 1-107; and Julius
Hirsch, Price Control in the War Economy (New York: Harper &
Brothers", W3), pp. 1^-23.
2Baruch, American Industry, pp. 83-8^.
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equi table balance between no profits and excess profits. As
stated by Baruch,
The aim of the Committee was to establish the figures
where no honest man should have sound grounds for
complaint that he did not receive "just compensation,"
measured in terms of cost production for the commodity
which he furnished; and yet so that, as far as was
humanly possible, men should not use their country's
distress for their own inordinate aggrandizement.
1
Effectiveness of Price Controls
Adams points out that price fixing has several defects
when used for the purpose of controlling profits. For one
thing, a price set high enough to provide an incentive to
j
produce and a profit for marginal or high-cost manufacturers
will result in very large profits for efficient, low-cost
producers. Also, price fixing commodity by commodity was
inefficient in that no definite unified policy was applied to
all industries or even to all segments of a particular
industry. Table 1 illustrates this last point.
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF PROFIT OR LOSS ON ALL BUILDING MATERIALS
SOLD TO THE GOVERNMENT AT FIXED PRICES^
Common Brick 3»76%
Crushed Stone 11. ?0
Grits -10.80 (Loss)
Gypsum Plaster Board 7.00
Gypsum Wall Board 1.65
Hollow Building Tile 6.30
Portland Cement 7.5®
Sand and Gravel 10.03
Sand-lime brick 9.60
Mill work 4.02




In addition, price fixing alone does not insure
Inst the realization of excessive profits because many
manufacturers who turned to the production of war materials
increased their level of production many times without
additional investment of their own capital; thus they
increased the return on their investment to very high levels.
Regardless of the many faults of price fixing, it is
generally accepted that wartime price controls were effective
in some ways. For instance, the fixing of wholesale prices
and profit margins for fuels and foods halted, or at least
decreased, the exploitation of consumers and prevented the
market prices from being magnified by the fear of shortages.
And in all probability, many prices in other industries
would have risen further than they did if it were not for
government price control.
Nevertheless, according to Adams, "There can be no
question of the profitability of the war years, both before
2
and after American participation." For example, the
average rate of return for 120 steel companies ranged from a
1915 rate of 7 Jj-- per cent to a high of 28.7 per cent in
1917, with a tapering off to 20 per cent in 1918. In 1913,
21 copper companies had an average return of 11. 7 per cent,
and in 1918 the average return was 24.4 per cent.










War I should take into account that (1) it v:as a pioneer
effort begun in an atmosphere of skepticism; (2) businessmen,
the press, and many economists were hostile to the whole idea
of government price fixing; and (3) the price fixing
authorities themselves were largely drawn from the business
world and thus had to placate their own consciences as well as
critical elements around them.
Post World War I
After the war, frequent cries of "war profiteer" were
heard in and out of Congress. Congressional committees, public
j
officials, and groups of private citizens castigated those "who
2had profited from the slaughter." The Federal Trade
Commission, in one of the earliest reports drafted on the
subject of profiteering, stated that
The Commission has reason to know that profiteering
exists. Much of it is due to advantages taken of the
necessities of the times as evidenced in the war
pressure for heavy production. Some of it is^attri but-
able to inordinate greed and barefaced fraud.
One widespread claim given much publicity was that
ii
23,000 millionaires were created as a result of world War I.
This unsubstantiated allegation served to add fuel to the
•4 bid
. , p. 110.
2Richards C. Osborne, The Renegotiati on of War Profits
(Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois, I9S0T, p. 9.
3
^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs,
Parings on H.R. 3 and H.R. 5293, Taking the Profits Out of
War, before the Committee, on Military Affairs, 7 4-th Cong., 1st
sess., 1935* p. 605. These hearings coiitain a reprint of the
original report of the FTC, Senate Document 2^4-8, 65th Cong.,





outcry against profiteers, and, coupled with the not
insignificant feeling that the citizens at home should be paid
the same as the boys fighting in the trenches, caused demands
for reform in legislation and for a complete survey of all the
war policies.
One of the most active groups in keeping the subject
of war profits before Congress was the American Legion. This
organization was the prime mover behind several bills
/introduced in Congress for the purpose of taking the profit
out of and equalizing the burdens of war. The Legion
strongly advocated the creation of the War Policies Commission,
which had as its purpose to
study and consider amending the Constitution of the
United States to provide that private property may
be taken for public use during war
. . .
[and] study
methods of equalizing the burdens and removing the
profits of war
s
together with a study of the policies
to be pursued in the event of war, 2
The Commission undertook this formidable task and in
1932 issued a report containing several recommendations, one
of which was an amendment to the Constitution defining the
power of Congress to prevent profiteering and stabilize prices
in time of war. Another recommendation was for a 95 per cent
tax to be imposed on individual and corporation incomes in
excess of the previous three-year average.
Although none of the recommendations of the Commission
was adopted, numerous investigations concerning excessive
Ibid
. , p. 619.
2Ibid
. , pp. 3-3?.
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profits continued to "be made in the 1930 ! s. The public
reaction towards profiteering had by this tine subsided
greatly, but Congressional committees pursued the inquiry at
length. Both political parties agreed that contractors had
received excessive profits during the war, but agreement was
nowhere near as unanimous as to how to prevent such occurences
in the future. One suggestion made was to tax away 100 per
cent of excess profits and another was to nationalize industry
during wartime. The majority of bills introduced during the
period had as premises the following: (1) profiteering was an
important cause of war, and (2) laws limiting personal gain
could make the country immune from such a conflict.
Regardless of the validity, or lack thereof, of these
premises, the only legislation to come from all the investiga-
tion. p.^rr to 3 93'-' was that outlawing (in most cases) cost-
plus-a-percentage-of-costs contracts which had been very
2prevalent during the war.
In 193^i the Vinson-Trammell Act was passed. This
Act was the direct forerunner of renegotiation and provided
for a profit limitation of 10 per cent on contracts for naval
ship construction and (by amendment in 1939) for a limitation
of 12 per cent on naval and army aircraft construction.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was a further step in
controlling peacetime profits, and it contained similar profit
1 2Osborne, War Profits
, p. 9. Ibid .
3v Vin s on -T rammell Act , S tatut e s _a
t
Large , XLVI 1 1
,
sec. 3, 95 U93*U.
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provisions applicable to merchant ships contracted for by the
Maritime Commission. In addition, this Act elaborated on the
costs which were allowable under these contracts. One
limitation included to pacify some of the critics that had
complained of the enormous salaries that contractors had been
charging to the government was that no more than $25,000 in
annual salary for an individual could be counted as a cost in
fulfilling a ship contract.
The Treasury Department was given the task of determin-
ing and collecting any profits in excess of the amounts
specified in either of the Acts. The problem was complicated
by the fact that most of the information regarding costs,
revenues, exemptions, etc. was obtained from reports submitted
by the contractors, and this information was, for the most
part, unverified by government auditors due to lsick of time,
2
money, and expertise.
Efforts to control profits during peacetime were not
very successful as most of the contracts were of a cost-plus
type, thereby creating for the contractors an incentive not to
increase efficiency but to increase costs so that a greater
dollar profit might be realized. A Senate Special Investigat-
ing Committee noted the following reaction to the passage of





atutes at Larg o , XLIX , sec.
505(b), 858 (1936).
2U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on
Investigation of the Munitions Industry, Preliminary Report on
NavaJ. Shipbuilding
.,
7 4th Cong., 1st sess., 1935, p7 32*K
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Very shortly after the bill was passed the ship-
builders and the large suppliers and Navy contractors,
and later the comptrollers of these various groups, got
together in long session to determine how the interpre-
tations of the bill could be arranged to suit their ,
interest. The main question was how to increase costs.
In June, 19^0, Congress further reduced the profit
margin allowed by the Vinson-Trammell Act by passing the
Speed-up Act. The 8 per cent limitation imposed by this Act
reflected the belief of Congress that even at 8 per cent, the
contractors were allowed sufficient opportunity for profits
because of the increased procurement of ships and aircraft that
was underway. The Act was also an implicit attempt to cut
down the amount of dollar profits realized through inflation
of costs.
The contractors, however, were not agreeable to this
new reduction. Foreign markets provided more opportunity for
profit, and the United States' defense build-up began to suffer
as more and more contractors refused to enter into government
contracts. This increasing reluctance finally prompted
Congress in September, 19^0, to rescind the reductions imposed,
19/12-1951
With the attack on Pearl harbor on December ?, 19*4-1
and the subsequent entry of the United States into World War
II, war production in all phases increased tremendously. But,






Statutes at Large, LIV, 676 (19^0), P.L. ?8l, ?6th
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should be ready with specific procedures "for industrial
mobilization, elimination of profiteering, and equalization of
the burdens of war,"' there was no plan for an effective
system for limiting war profits. There were statutes concerned
with price and wage controls, rationing, excess-profits taxes,
and systems of priorities, but these were seen as not really
effective against profiteering of the magnitude experienced in
World War I
.
Most government contracts since World War I had been
let by competitive bidding, but World War II brought forth a
change in emphasis toward contracting by negotiation. The
procurement and manufacture of urgent war materials with the
greatest speed was the primary purpose of the negotiation type
of contract. Two classes of items were procured in this way:
(1) common, everyday items which could be priced through
catalogs, and (2) special materials such as tanks, battleships,
and the like. It was the second class that caused the
greatest problems. To cope with the increased demand for all
types of certain war products, new factories had to be built
and old ones had to be converted (often with a substantial
proportion of government funds). Once capable facilities were
established, the problems of pricing became paramount. Since
many of the products desired had never been made or even
designed before, the prices arrived at between the government
and the contractors were frequently only estimates, and poor





on contracts would have to be redetermined or renegotiated in
order to protect everyone's interest. A partial solution to
this problem took the form of a system of voluntary renegotia-
tion instituted by the War and Navy Departments and the
Maritime Commission. Contractors were asked to retroactively
redetermine their contract prices taking into account previous
2production experience and present conditions.
But voluntary renegotiation was not enough. A famous
case in which public attention was again focused on profiteer-
ing and which led to specific Congressional action on excess
profits was that of United States v. Bethelehem Steel
C ompany . ^ In World War I, the government had entered into a
contract with Bethlehem allowing the company incentive profits
of 50 Pe r cent of the difference between actual and estimated
costs of the ships built by Bethlehem. Profits of 22 per cent
came to be realized by the company, and the United States
brought suit to recover a portion of these profits. The
Supreme Court upheld Bethlehem because there had been no
provision in the contract for recoupment of excess profits.
More importantly, however, the Court clearly put the burden of
legislating against war profits on the shoulders of Congress
by the following statement from the opinion by Justice Black:
The problem of war profits is not new. -In this
Madeline S. Franks, "Renegotiation of War Contracts"
(unpublished thesis, Portia Law School, 19^0, pp. 13-15.
2
E. S. Hagedorn, "A Survey of Renegotiation"
(unpublished thesis, The George Washington Unlvers.it.y-, i960),
p. 21.
3U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Company, 315 U.S. 289 (19'42).
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country, every war we have engaged in has provided
opportunities for profiteering and they have been too
often scandalously seized. See Hearings before the
House Committee on Military Affairs on H.R, 3 and H.R.
5293, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 59O-598. To meet this
recurrent evil, Congress has at times taken various
measures. It has authorized price-fixing. It has
plac'ed a fixed limit on profits, or has recaptured
high profits through taxation. It has expressly
reserved for the Government the right to cancel contracts
after they have been made. Pursuant to Congressional
authority, the Government has requisitioned existing
production facilities or itself built and operated new
ones to provide needed war materials. It may be that
one or some or all of these measures should be utilized
more comprehensively, or that still other measures must
be devised. But if the Executive is in need of addition-
al laws by which to protect the nation against war
profiteering, the Constitution has given to Congress, not
to this Court, the power to make them.l
A further impetus to the realization of a renegotia-
tion law was the revelation by a Congressional Naval Affairs
Committee of the enormous profits received by the Jack and
Heintz Company, manufacturers of army airplane equipment.
The company had received considerable publicity for its novel
way of treating Its employees or "associates." Free lunches,
vacations, uniforms, use of company resorts, and very high
2pay were some of the benefits dispensed by Jack and Heintz.
However, the government did not receive any "benefits" in the
form of contract price reductions, and, as a matter of fact,
appeared to be paying for a large part of the "benefits"
received by the "associates." After the Committee made public
its findings, Jack and Heintz voluntarily reduced prices by
$10 million on ..$50 million worth of government contracts still
outstanding. Other companies quickly followed suit to escape
'Ibid. 2Fran k s , "War C on trac t s , " p . 22.
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the onus of unfavorable publicity.
This belated voluntary effort to reduce prices was not
enough to halt the renegotiation movement in Congress, and
on April 23, 19^2, the Sixth Supplemental Defense Appropria-
tions Act was passed. Section ^03 of this Act, more popularly
known as the Renegotiation Act of 19^2, provided that the
Secretaries of the War Department, Navy and Treasury Depart-
ments, the Maritime Commission, and various other defense
agencies were required
to insert in any contract for an amount in excess of
$100,000.00 . . .
(1) a provision for the renegotiation of the
contract price at a period or periods when, in
the judgment of the Secretary, the profits can
be determined with reasonable certainty;
(2) a provision for the retention by the United
States from amounts otherwise due the contractor,
or for the repayment by him to the United States,
if paid to him, of any excessive profits not
eliminated through reductions in the contract ?
price, or otherwise, as the Secretary may direct.
This first Renegotiation Act was designed to serve two
principal functions: (1) adjusting contract prices to those
which would have been agreed upon if the factors known at the
present time had been known when the contract was let, and (2)
recapturing excess profits which had been realized, or were
"Profits—End of Uncertainty," Time , October 5, 19^2,
pp. 82-83.










likely to be realized by contractors. To assist the govern-
ment in carrying out these functions, the law provided that
contractors were required to submit certain financial informa-
tion to the various Secretaries and to open their books to
government auditors for the purpose of ascertaining the
2
methods of accounting used in determining costs and revenues.
There was considerable controversy in the months
following passage of the Renegotiation Act. The business
community was unsure of what the lav; was supposed to do and
how it was going to do it. And since the Secretaries of the
Departments had delegated the administration of renegotiation
to their respective War Contract Price Adjustment Boards, the
Boards naturally desired and needed clear meanings as to the
intent of Congress in passing the bill. In addition, various
definitions and administrative procedures outlined in the law
required further clarification in order to become moderately
workable. One of these hazy definitions, called a "masterpiece
of ambiguity," was that of "excessive profits." The original
wording follows: "The term 'excessive profits 1 means any amount
of a contract or subcontract price which is found as a result
"Rules for Renegotiation," Business Week, August 22,
19^-2, pp. 1*4—15. See also U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on
Finance, Renegotiation of Cont racts, Hearings before the
Committee on Finance, Senate, on Section 403 of Public Law
Numbered 528, An Act Making Additional Appropriations for the
National Defense for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 19^2, and
for other purposes, 77th Cong., 2d sess., September 22, 23,
W2, p. 17.




of renegotiation to represent excessive profits."
On the basis of this section, many businessmen rather
cynically adopted the view that Congress recognized that what
business makes on its war contracts depended more and more on
2government price adjustment boards.
Osborne succinctly sums up the position of businessmen
on renegotiation as stated in the press and before Congres-
sional hearings:
Many business groups, large and small, vociferously
declared "This can't be done to us." They lambasted
the Act as wholly un-American, unconstitutional,
unnecessary, ill-advised, or detrimental to the war
effort and the economic stability of the country.
These and other businessmen prefaced their remarks,
however, with a statement that excessive profits should
not be made from the war. As a matter of strategy,
their specific proposals dealt primarily with revisions
that would emasculate the Act; they did not advocate
its outright repeal. Each industrial group considered
itself to be a special case and suggested amendments to
the lav; which would reduce drastically or eliminate
recoveries from their own profits.
3
Several basic objections to the lav; were voiced by
both contractors and government officials charged with
administering renegotiation. First, postwar reconversion
reserves were not allowed. Industry wanted to make some
allowance for the anticipated costs of retooling machinery and
converting plants to peacetime production at the end of the





"Great Game of War Contracts," Time, November 16,
1942, p. 94.
-^Osborne, War Profits, p. 19.

affair, with all the cards being held by the government.
This was especially true with respect to the proceedings
before the various price adjustment boards; there was no
right of appeal to the courts for the contractor. Third,
most businessmen and some government officials wanted standard
commercial articles exempt from renegotiation, especially
those that already came under Office of Price Administration
price ceilings. Fourth, the Act was thought to be discrimina-
tory in that it applied only to defense producers and not to
farmers and other wage earners. Fifth, there was a constant
threat of uncertainty in that there was no specific formula
for determining exactly what constituted "excessive profits."
Many of these and other related objections were valid
and were not to be dealt with to everyone's satisfaction for
the duration of the war. However, as a result of pressure
from business, administrative officials, Congressional
investigating committees, and the general public, Congress
enacted the Renegotiation Act of 19^3 on. February 25, 19^^.
Several changes from the previous Renegotiation Act viere made
For a discussion of these points and variations
thereto, see the following: Osborne, Ibid.
, pp. 20-21;
"Change of Rules," Business 'week, October 10, 19*1-2, pp. 27, 30;
"Rules for Renegotiation,", Busine s s Week, August 22, 19*4-2, pp.
1^-15; "Profits in a Vise," Business Week, August 15, 19^2," p.
Ik; "New Deal on War Contracts," Business Week, August 15, 19*1-2,
p. 100; "Renegotiation Keeps Industry Stumbling in Fiscal
Blackout," Newsweek, October 19, 19'+2, pp. 5**, 5?; National
Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Renegotiation of Government
Contracts (Washington, D.C.: National Industrial Conference
Board, Inc., 19*1-2), p. ?; "How We Take the Profiteer Out of
War," Saturday Evening Post, March 27, 19'+3, p. 100; "Industry's
Renegotiation Case, ""Business Week, July 3, 19^3, p. 108; "How's
Your Renegotiation?" Fortune , "February , 1944, pp. lio-*J-l;
"Preparing Postwar Jobs in the Dark," Nation ' s Business,
.




in this new law. One was the establishment of a War Contracts
Price Adjustment Board, in which was vested the responsibility
for formulation and promulgation of uniform policies and
practices for renegotiation. Another was the provision of
appeal to the Tax Court of the United States by contractors
who felt aggrieved at a unilateral determination by one of the
agency price adjustment boards.
One of the most important changes was that of a
redefinition of excessive profits. The previous definition
was expanded to include seven statutory factors which had to
be taken into account by any board which was in the process of
determining excessive profits. These factors were : (1)
efficiency of contractor, (2) reasonableness of costs and
profits, (3) amounts and sources of public and private -capital
employed, (k) extent of risk assumed, (5) nature and extent of
contribution to the war effort, (6) character of business, and
(?) other factors that may be published in regulations of the
boards.
Industry objections to the Act of 19^3 did not
substantially differ from those directed against the first'
Renegotiation Act; but by this point in time, most companies
realized that renegotiation was, for all intents and purposes,
a permanent part of the wartime process. There were still
Hen egotiat i on_jLct_of
_
19^3 » Statutes at Large , LVI 1 1
,
sec. ?01(b77 o3 (19W. For a discussion of the statutory
factors required to be taken into account and of the other
changes to the Act of 19^2, see the following: Osborne, War
Contracts
, pp. 21-22; "ilenegotiation Methods Stand," Business
Week, June 10, 19-Vj-, pp. 21-2^.
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numerous conflicts over procedural matters and over some of
the basic tenets of renegotiation, but most of the parties
involved preferred renegotiation over other, less desirable
alternatives." And the effects of renegotiation were not all
bad. For instance, businessmen, by having to undergo
renegotiation during the war, were to an extent protected from
the stigma of profiteering after the vjar. Defense contracting
was seen as a respectable occupation, and it was to the con-
tractors' benefit to perform to the best of their ability so
2that they might remain respectable.
The Renegotiation Act of 19^3 expired on December 31
•
19*+5 1 thus fulfilling Senator Harry 3. Truman's prophecy that
"the Act should be writing its own death warrant by utiliza-
tion of early experience in late-war contracting. nJ
Although no renegotiation law was in effect between
19^5 and 19^8, the review of some 120,000 war contracts subject
to renegotiation was still underway, and as of May, 1938, some
98 per cent of these contracts had been reviewed. There
occurred at this time a case in the Supreme Court that
threatened to overturn all the profit recoveries to date. The
principal issues in Lichter v. United States were the
constitutionality of the Renegotiation Acts of 19^2 and 19^3
1
"Row's Your Renegotiation?" Fortune, February, 19*j4,
p. 2^9.
2War Contracts Price Adjustment Board, Final Report
(Washington, D.C.: War Contracts Price Adjustment Board,"
Kay 22, 1951 ) , PP. 2-6.
3
^"Procedure is Attacked Anew as Confusing and
Unneccessary, " Newsweek , June 7, 3.9^3, p. 73.
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and whether or not the failure of the petitioner to seek a
redetermination of the excess profits from the Tax Court of
the United States operated as a bar to further access to the
Courts.
The Renegotiation Act of 19'*3 had authorized con-
tractors to appeal adverse decisions to the Tax Court, which
had
. . .
exclusive jurisdiction ... to finally determine
i the amount, if any, of such excessive profits received
. . . and such determination shall not be reviewed or
redetermined by any court or agency.
The Lichter Company argued that . renegotiation was illegal
and that there was therefore no reason to appeal to the Tax
Court. The Supreme Court upheld the Circuit Court of Appeals,
thereby confirming the legality of renegotiation and conse-
quently saving the government the task of returning the $11
billion in recoveries received for the period April 28, 19^-2
to December 31, 19 /!-5.
In 19^-8,' renegotiation was back again as law. Power
was given to the Secretary of Defense to establish three
boards to administer the Renegotiation Act of 19-t8. The Navy,
Army, and Air Force each had a five -man board, the chairman
of each collectively making up a top-leve3 Military Renegotia-
tion Policy and Review Board which reported directly to the
Secretary of Defense. Although many of the provisions of the
law were the same as those in the original Acts, a certain key
-"Lichter v. U.S., 68 Sup. Ct. 129','- (19^8).
Ren egot i a t i on Ac t of 19*f3 , sec. 108.
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few \iere different, and because of these (particularly ones
relating to exemptions), the Act had limited applicability.
The results of World War II renegotiation were stated
by the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board in its Final
Report, Gross recoveries of approximately $11 billion were
made on renegotiable sales of some £223 billion. Net recov-
eries after credit for income taxes was approximately $k
billion, and the administrative costs incurred by renegotia-
tion were $*H million.
Monetary results were not the only accomplishment,
however. The following were noted as additional beneficial
effects: (1) inflation was mitigated in part by the impact of
lower prices in successive procurements; (2) voluntary refunds
and price reductions were made, and although not directly
mopsurable
s
the Bop"rd believed the amount to be sub <r; t^ v> +"ii p] ;
(3) existence of statutory renegotiation caused contractors to
price more closely than they would otherwise have done, and as
a result, procurement was put on a "relatively solid footing
in the latter years of the war;" and (k) businesses in
general were not subjected to the widespread antagonism and
close investigation as that which followed World War I.
Others held views which did not see renegotiation as
beneficial and successful as the War Contracts Price Adjustment
"Two Boards to Direct Renegotiation Act'," Aviation
Week, August 9, 19^8, PP. 11-12.
2,,
p. 2.





Board did. A Senate Special Investigating Committee found
several shortcomings in the ways in which renegotiation vras
administered, and industry found fault not only with
administration, but also with the entire principle of
renegotiation.
The outbreak of the Korean War saw government procure-
ment about to mushroom, and the Secretary of Defense requested
a more powerful lav? than what was presently in force. At one
point during public testimony, a Chamber of Commerce
representative said the proposed bill (H.R. 1724) was
"undemocratic and un-American." This represented practically
no change from the organization's World War II position when
Ellsworth G. Alvord, Chairman of its Finance Committee,
appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee in November,
19^3* and said, "The recapture of excess profits through so-
called renegotiation can't be justified and the delegation of
unlimited and uncontrollable powers essential to its •
administration is dangerous and un-American."
Public testimony notwithstanding, Public Law 82-9, the
Renegotiation Act of 1951 » was passed on March 23, 1951* Tlie
remainder of this paper will be devoted to a discussion of
renegotiation and of the federal agency created by this Act,
the Renegotiation Board.
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Congress and the
Nation (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965),
P. 33^.
2Lawrence Sullivan, "Preparing Postwar Jobs in the




This chapter has described the efforts of the
government to control v.Tartime profits, the coordination of
industrial expansion, and the inflationary character of the
economy during World War I. The setting of price levels as
determined by a Price-Fixing Committee under the "War Industries
Board was the primary means of early control. This price
control was effective in some ways and not effective in others.
The main area of its ineffectiveness was in the controlling of
profits.
After the war, many investigations were carried out on
war policies in general, and the control of war profits in
particular. These investigations and the experiences developed
during the war pointed out that other measures were needed to
curtail the war profiteer. There was no unanimity, however,
concerning the proper ways to insure that the reaping of
enormous war profits would not happen again, either in peace-
time or wartime.
Peacetime profit limitation was tried with the
passage of the Vinson-Trammell end Merchant Marine Acts in
193^ and 1936, respectively. Neither of these Acts were
regarded as a panacea for the ills of exorbitant profits.
Soon after the commencement of World 'War II, renegotia-
tion, as it is known today, was initiated with the passage of
the Sixth Supplemental Defense Appropriations Act. Reaction to
the law was varied and sometimes violent. But as the war
continued , most saw renegotiation as -a necessary complement to
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the other wartime measures in force.
Renegotiation expired in 19--J-5 "but v:as renewed to a
limited extent in 19^8, thus prompting additional criticisms
At the start of the Korean War, a new federal agency, the
Renegotiation Board, was created for the purpose of




THE RENEGOTIATION ACT OF 1951
Introducti on
The Renegotiation Act of 1951. approved on March 23,
1951, formed the basic block upon which was to be built all
subsequent renegotiation legislation and regulations. The
basic principles of renegotiation as outlined in the Acts of
19^-2 and 19^3 remained the same, but many of the detailed
procedures and methods of administering renegotiation did not.
For the first time in any renegotiation act, Congress
stated its policy and thereby put on notice contractors,
businessmen, and skeptical government officials that renegotia-
tion was to be an integral and important part of national
defense policy. Section 101 of the Act states as follows:
It is hereby recognized and declared that the Congress
has made available for the execution of the national
defense program extensive funds, by appropriation and
otherwise, for the procurement of property, processes,
and services, and the construction of facilities
necessary for the national defense; that sound execution
of the national defense program requires the elimination
of excessive profits from contracts made with the United
States, and from related subcontracts, in the course of
said program; and that the considered policy of the
Congress, in the interests of the national defense ana
the general welfare of the Nation, requires that such -,
excessive profits be eliminated' as provided in this title.
Renegotiation Act of 1951, Statutes at Lar^e, LXV,






One of the differences between the Act of 1951 &n<l
previous renegotiation acts was the creation of an independent
agency in the executive branch of the Government— the Renego-
tiation Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). All the
functions, powers, and duties of the War Contracts Price
Adjustment Board of 19^3 vintage were transferred to the new
Renegotiation Board. This particular provision of the law
caused some confusion with relation to cases still pending in
the Tax Court. The original lav; stated that the transfer of
records was not to prejudice cases which had been brought by
or against the War Contracts Board provided that the Renegotia-
tion Board filed a motion to keep the case on the docket in its
own name. Due to administrative difficulties during its early
existence, the Board did not file several of the required
motions, with the result that the Tax Court dismissed the
applicable cases. The affected contractors did not have long
to rejoice, however, as the lav; was amended in 195^ to provide
that any case dismissed due to administrai tve oversight was
"hereby revived and reinstated in such court as if it had not
2been dismissed.
"
The Board is composed of five members appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
The men comprising the original Board were recommended to the





sec. 201(b) as amended by Public Law ?6'f, 83d
Congress, September 1, 195^-.

President by the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy,
and Administrator of General Services* According to the
Board's Chairman, Lawrence Kartwig, the recommendations are
made by the above-named individuals to preserve in some way
the non-partisanship of the Board. He also feels that this
provision alone is sufficient to maintain this non-partisanship
and that a proposed requirement in the law that not more than
three of the members be of the same political party (a require-
ment that is found in much of the law concerning regulatory
commissions) would be superfluous, but not objectionable.
Related to this factor of non-partisanship is that of
independence. One of the primary reasons for setting up the
Board was to have an independent agency oversee the entire
war profits operations. Many felt that renegotiation pro-
cedures under the Department of Defense and the War Contracts
Price Adjustment Boards had, since 19^8, become quite loose
and ineffective. Although all the members of the first Board
had had much experience in renegotiation and some had even
been members of predecessor War Contracts Boards, the Board
was still considered independent by virtue of the fact that it
reported to Congress. The previous experience and positions of
the members were considered of great value to the transition
2
and initial organization of the Board.
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means,
Intension of Renegotiation Act, JSearin^s , before the Committee
on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, on Extending and
Amending the Renegotiation Act, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968,
pp. 51-52.
2Renegotiation Act of 1951 . sec. 107; and "Bill Sets up
New Renegotiation Board," Aviation Week, March 19, 1951, p. 16.
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The present Chairman of the Board was appointed as such
in 19^1, some ten years after his appointment as one of the
original members. The other four members of the Board were
appointed between 1961 and 19^3 •
The Board is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and has
as subsidiaries the Eastern Regional Renegotiation Board (in
the same location) and the Western Regional Renegotiation
Board, located in Los Angeles. The two regional boards were
consolidated in 1962 from the four field boards that were
2
originally organized under the Act of 1951*
Figure 1 shows the organization and duties of the
headquarters Board and the organization of the regional boards.
While the organization of the Board has remained
fairly stable since its inception, the number of personnel
attached to it have not. Table 2 shows the nuidber of personnel
that have been on duty with the Board on June 30 of every
fiscal year since 1952.
As is readily' observable, the number of personnel has
fluctuated from a high of ?^2 in 1953 to a low of 1?8 in D.967
.
The Korean War and its aftermath contributed to the high
number, and government cost-cutting and employment controls
contributed to the recent lows. What the table fails to bring
out is that the workload of the Board has not decreased as the
total number of personnel have. Increased procurement due to
U.S., Renegotiation Board, Twelfth Annual Report




Fig. 1. --Organization of the Renegotiation Boarda
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Vietnam has been reflected in the amount of filings that the
Board has received from contractors. The level of procure-
ment is even greater than that of the Korean V/ar. For example,
in 1952, prime contract awards were $43.5 "billion, while in
I967 they were $44.5 billion. 'While it is not practicable to
relate personnel to dollars of obligation, at least one
Representative has remarked that "the burdens per man have




Year quarters Boards Total
1952 169 389 558
1953 178 564 742
1954 174 465 639
1955 193 3^7 540
1956 181 285 466
1957 155 204 359
1958 142 184 326
1959 136 165 301
i960 130 154 284
1961 123 148 271
1962 114 79 193
1963 131 92 223
1964 121 85 206
1965 108 76 184
1966 101 78 179
1967 . . 102 76 178
1968 96 88 184
U.S., Renegotiation Board, Thirteenth Annual Report
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968)
,
p. 15.
Testimony of Representative Charles A. Vanik,




The tables presented belcw detail the changes in work-














1968 . . 4-, 35'+
TABLE 5
DISPOSITION OF FILINGS SCREENED
' Cleared at





Number Total Number Total
1965 3,691 3,336 90J+ 355 9.6
1966 3,372 2,928 87.O W\- 13.0
1967 3,782 3,1^7 83.2 635 16.8
1968 ^,35-'s- 3,527 81.0 827 19.0
Source of Tables 3, fc, 5, and 6
Thirteenth Annual Report
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As the tables indicate, not only have the number of
filings increased, but the percentage of cases assigned to the
regional boards and the backlog at the boards have increased.
Staff productivity has risen as measured by the increase in the
number of cases handled by the regional boards and in the
number of screenings reviewed by headquarters. But the time
for processing the cases at the regional level has remained at
about fifteen months, while that of the headquarters screening
has declined only from forty-eight to thirty-nine days in the
last two years. Thus the increased productivity has not kept
1pace with the rising workload.
The Board is analogous to the General Accounting Office
(GAO) in that both are independent agencies and report to the
Congress. Unlike the. GAO, however, the Board has had to
justify its continued existence every one to four years,
depending on the time limits of expiration as set out in the
nine extensions to the original Act of 195^- • F°^ example, in
195^ the Act was extended for one year, and in 1955 it was
Renegotiation Board, Twelfth Annual Report, p, 7, and
Thirteenth Annual Report, p. 7.
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extended for another one-year period. In 1962, it was
extended for four years, and last year it was extended for
three years to June 30. 1971 •
The Congressional hearings conducted prior to these
various extensions have provided one of the few opportunities
for the Board to present its case to Congress and the public.
Industry also has the sane opportunity to air its views at the
hearings--an opportunity that is normally well taken advantage
of. For example, there were submitted to the House Ways and
Means Committee in March, 1968, some twenty-seven letters from
interested lobbies, associations, and private citizens.
2Twenty-three of the letters were anti -renegotiation. The
four letters which were pro-renegotiation represent at least
some improvement over the situation in 1966 when, in response
to the Ways and Means Committee's public announcement that "it
would be pleased to receive written comments from any
interested individuals or organizations," only opponents of
the Board replied.
The Process of Renegoti ation
Scope
The following are the laws that have amended and
extended the Renegotiation Act of 1951 : P.L. 764, 83d Cong.;
P.L. 216, 84th Con--.; P.L. 8?0, 84th Cong.; P.L. 85-930, 85th
Cong.; P.L. 86-89, 86th Cong.; P.L. 8?-520, 8?th Cong.; P.L.
88-339, 88th Cong.; P.L. 89-480, 89th Cong. ; and P.L. 90-634,
90th Cong,.
2House, Extension of Renegotiation Act, Hearin gs, pu.
201-226.
3
'Sanford Watzman, "Little Watchdog of the Dollar
Warriors," The Nation, March 4, 1968, p. 298.

-39-
The Act of 1951 applies only to contracts with the
following government agencies: The Departments of Defense,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the Maritime Administra-
tion, The Federal Maritime Board, The General Services
Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Aviation
Administration. During the Korean War, this list was
considerably longer and included such agencies as the United
States Coast Guard, the Defense Materials Procurement Agency,
2
and the Federal Civil Defense Administration.
The contracts with these agencies must, in the aggre-
gate, add to more than $1 million before they are susceptible
to renegotiation. In other words, a contractor does not have
to undergo renegotiation for a particular fiscal year if his
renegbtiable sales 60 not amount to more th«r> $0. minion.
This "floor" has not always been at the present level; it
started in 1951 at $250,000, was increased to $500,000 in 1953,
and was established at the present level in 1956. Renegotia-
tion is not conducted on individual contracts, but only on the
totals of such contracts. The Board's Thirteenth Annual Report
states the difference between renegotiation in total and on a
contract«by-contract basis:
Under the statute, renegotiation is conducted not
Renegotiation Board, Twelfth Annual Report, p. 2.
2U.S., Renegotiation Board, Renegotiation Act of 1 951
as Amended Through October 24, 1968 (Washington, D.C, : Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1968), pp. i-ii. This publication





with respect to Individual contracts, but with respect
to the receipts or accruals under all renegotiable
contracts and subcontracts of a contractor in the con-
tractor's fiscal year. The contracts may vary in form
from cost-plus-a-fixed-fee to firm fixed-price; they
may be prime contracts or subcontracts; and they may
relate to a variety of products and services. Also,
they may be performed over differing periods: some
may be completed within a single fiscal year of a
contractor, while the performance of others may extend
beyond such year. Accordingly, aggregate renegotiable
profits in a given fiscal year of a contractor will
often reflect the performance of several contracts in
different stages of completion, and may result from an
offset of losses or low profits on some contracts
against high or even excessive profits on others. Thus
i
fiscal-year renegotiation, which deals with aggregate
profits, is entirely different from price adjustment or
redetermination of individual contract prices pursuant
to contract provisions.-'-
In addition to losses on contracts offsetting profits
on others, if a contractor suffers a loss on his entire renego-
tiable business, he may carry this loss forward and apply it
to his renegotiable sales for that year. Prior to 195&, this
provision was not in effect, and a contractor who may have been
in the position of incurring a large loss in one year and a
large profit in another would be liable for renegotiation of
the p.rofit year without being able to take advantage of the
2loss.
Because of certain exemptions, some contractors are
excluded partially or entirely from renegotiation. Among the
mandatory exemptions are the following types of contracts and
subcontracts: (1) those with Territories, States, or foreign
governments, (2) those for agricultural commodities in their
Renegotiation Board, Thirteenth Annual Report, p. 3.
2Renegotiation Board, Renegotiatl qd Act of 1951 as
Amended Through October 2k, 19"6S, pp. ii, "6.
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"raw or natural state" (eggs, fish, milk, animals, etc.), (3)
those for the products of mines, oil or gas wells, and forests,
(if-) those with common carriers for transportation, or with
public utilities for gas, electricity, or water, provided that
the rates charged are not in excess of those allowed by the
public regulatory agency, (5) those with organizations exempt
from taxation under section 101(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code, (6) those which the Board determines do not have "a
direct and immediate connection with the national defense," and
(?) those for an article or service which is determined to be




Historically, the most difficult of the above exemp-
tions to apply and the ones that have caused the most contro-
versy have boon the standard commercial article and service
exemptions. Simply stated, if a contractor sells an article or
service to the government which he also sells to other non-
defense purchasers, he' is allowed to exclude from his renego-
tiate sales the revenues accrued from the sale, provided that
he sells at least 35 per cent of the product to the non-
2government purchasers. As an example, if a manufacturer were
to sell 650,000 bolts to the government at a price of $1 per
bolt and another 350 ,000 bolts to non- government buyers, the
Renegotiation A ct of 1951 1 sec. 1 6
.
2With the passage of PcL. 90-63^, this percentage was
increased to 55 per cent on all sales received after October 2 l± t
I968. This increase was considered a partial victory by
proponents of renegotiation who have been trying for years to




$650,000 would be deducted from the contractor's other re-
negotiable sales. An additional benefit here has been that if,
by applying this exemption, the contractor's sales were below
the $1 million floor, he would not have to file a report to
the Board and thus would escape any review.
The exemption is self-applied by the contractor when
there is only a single article involved as in the preceding
example. If there is a class of similar articles, an exemption
may be granted for the entire class, but only upon application
to and approval by the Board. In fiscal I967, contractors who
filed reports with the Board indicated self-application of the
exemption in the amount of $772.6 million, and for fiscal 1968,
this amount was $860.2 million. The corresponding figure for
fiscal I965 was $56l million, indicating that increased Vietnam
procurement has influenced the contractors to clh.\m more
exemptions. Table 7 shows the applications for the commercial
exemption that have been received by the Board.
Of interest in this table is that the amount of exemp-
tions applied for in 1968 increased 91 per cent over those of
I967. This increase cannot help but add fuel to the arguments
of the renegotiation proponents that exemptions are costly to
the government in that more of them are being approved, thus
reducing the effect of the Board. The table shows £5.7 billion
in exemptions that have been approved since 1951» Add to this
the several billion in self-applied exemptions and the unknown
self-applied amount from contractors who were below the floor,




and the result is probably in excess of $15 billion.
TABLE 7
APPLICATION FOR COMMERCIAL EXEMPTION8
(Sales in Thousands of Dollars)
Appli- Amount Amount Amount
cations Applied for Approved Denied
Through June 30,
1966 1,815 43^,211,630 $3,926,912 $284,718
Fiscal Year 1967 251 671,901 636,611 35,290
Fiscal Year 1968 387 1,281,929 1,223,812 58,11?
Total 2,4-53 WT^SMo %5,7$77JT5 ^3787125
Source: Renegotiation Board, Twelfth Annual Report
,
p. 13, and Thirt eenth Annual Report , p"^ PIT
-
i
In addition to the mandatory exemptions, the Board, in
its discretion, can exempt from some or all provisions of the
Renegotiation Act the following: (1) any contracts to be per-
formed outside the territorial limits of the United States,
(2) contracts under which the profits can be determined with
reasonable certainty when the contract price is established
(example—lease and license agreements), (3) any contracts
where, in the opinion of the Board, the provisions are other-
wise adequate to prevent excessive profits, {k) any contract
the renegotiation of which would violate secrecy which may be
required in the public interest, and (5) any other contracts
where it is not administratively feasible to segregate the
profits attributable to such contracts from activities not
subject to renegotiation.
To some people, the exemption provisions of the
Renegotiation Act of 19.51 , sec. 106(d).

Renegotlation Act have been nothing but convenient loopholes
for contractors; to others, they have been necessary additions
to a law that is basically distasteful to begin with. Regard-
less of the view taken, the mere processing of the paperwork
connected with exemptions has been an additional increase in
workload, both for the Board and for the contractors who invoke
the exemptions.
Proceedings Before the Board
The first step in the renegotiation process is for the
Board to send out various forms and questionnaires for the
contractors to fill out concerning their renegotiable business.
Appendix A contains a reprint of the standard package. Con-
tractors who are not on the mailing list of the Board can
obtain the same forms from field offices of the Department of
Commerce or from the regional boards.
Contractors not above the floor of $1 million are not
required to file a "Standard Form of Contractor's Report for
Renegotiation" (RB Form 1) with the Board but may do so if they
wish. Many contractors take advantage of this provision; in
fiscal year 1968, the number of below~the~floor filings received
was 2.328. 1
Even though a contractor may be under the statutory
floor and thus not required to file a report, the Board can
require that he furnish certain financial data, 'and a failure to
do so can result in a fine of "not more than $10,000 or
2imprisonment for not more than one year, or both." The Board
Renegotiation Board, Thirteenth Armual Report, p. 6.
Renegotiation Act of 1951* sec . 105 (e)(1).
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would normally do this where it had reason to suspect that a
contractor was self-applying more than the allowable exemptions
or not reporting all his receipts and accruals for a fiscal
year. However, the application of this provision has been
quite infrequent due to the tremendous workload in processing
just the required filings (see Table 4).
To try to alleviate this problem of contractor dis-
honesty and to concurrently do away with the necessity of
trying to determine which contractors to check, there is a pro-
vision in the latest amendment to the Act to the effect that all
contractors that apply self-exemptions which cause their re-
negotiable sales to fall below the minimum are required to file
either a "Statement of Self-exemption" or a "Statement of Non-
applicability of the Renegotiation Act."
In addition to requiring financial information from
the contractors, the Board has the right to audit the books
and records of contractors subject to the Act. These audits
are normally conducted in conjunction with or by Internal
Bevenue personnel so that duplication of effort is avoided and
2
economies are effected.
The second step in the process involves reviewing all
the contractor filings which have been sent to the Board in
Washington. The voluntary filings (below-the-floor) are
Renegotiation Board, Renegotiation Act 'of 19^1 as
Amended Through October 2^, 1968, p. 12, The second statement
referred to is contained in Appendix A; the Statement of Self-
exeraption has not been published except in summary form in
U.S., Renegotiation Board, Regulations, Federal Register,
XXXIII, no. 218,' November 7, 1968, l63>+0.
2Renegotiation Act of 1951 , sec. 105(e)(2).

reviewed for acceptability and usually nothing further is done
with' them. Above-the-floor filings are either "cleared with-
out assignment" or are assigned to the regional boards for
further processing. Once a clearance is issued, the case is
not reopened unless there later appears evidence of fraud.
The Board has a one-year limitation imposed on it to either
clear a case or assign it to a regional board. Table 5 shows
that the great majority of filings processed are cleared with-
out assignment.
i
I The third and most complicated step in the process is
involved with the processing of the cases by the Eastern and
[
western Regional Boards and the final processing and/or review
by the Board. This important step is where renegotiation per
se is conducted. The regional boards review the forms as sub-
mitted by the contractor and will request such additional
information as deemed necessary. The regional board personnel
may visit the contractor's plant to obtain verification of
certain items. After the field visits are conducted, the
personnel assigned to the case will fill out and submit to the
full regional board a "Report of Renegotiation." The Board
will make a tentative determination as to whether the contrac-
tor will be cleared or whether there are excessive profits
involved.
A renegotiation conference is set up with the contrac-
tor and the personnel that worked on the "Report of
U.S., Cod e of Federal Regulations, Title 32, Chapter
XIV, sec. 1^?3. 1.
"
U.S., Code of Federal Regulations, sec. 1^72. 3.
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Renegotiation." The contractor is allowed to present any-
relevant material at the conference, and the proceedings are
informal and confidential. During this stage, the evaluation
of the contractor's business takes into account the statutory
factors concerning excess profits which are listed in Chapter
II. The consideration of these factors is not restricted by
formulae or regulations from higher authority, although many
would argue that there should be some consistency in their
application.
At the conclusion of the conference, the determination
I
is either finalized or modified by the regional board. If the
contractor' agrees with the determination, no further meetings
are necessary, and a formal agreement will be drawn up which
is binding on the contractor once it has been approved. If the
contractor does not agree with the ruling, a unilateral order
will be issued. This order essentially states that the con-
tractor has been found to have received excessive profits of a
certain amount and that he is in debt to the government for
such amount.
Tables 8 and 9 indicate that most determinations result
in bilateral agreements between the Board and the contractor
(89-5 per cent). Out of the 399 unilateral orders that have
been issued, some 152 have been appealed to the Tax Court.
Thus more than half of the unilateral orders are agreed to by
the contractors without going to the courts.
In class A cases (more than .$800,000 of renegotiable
"S-bid., ccc. 14-75'. 1.
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profits), the regional boards have no authority to make agree-
ments or issue unilateral orders; they can only make recommenda-
tions to the Board in Washington as to final disposition of the
case. For class B cases (less than .j>800,000 of renegotiable
profits) , the regional boards do have the authority to make
agreements and issue orders, although the orders are subject to
appeal as set forth below.
TABLE 8
NUMBER OF DETERMINATI0N3 a
By Agree- % of By % of
Total ment Total Order Total
Through June 30,
1967 3,755 3,375 89.9 380 10.1
Fiscal Year 1968
_46 27 58.7 _19 41.3
Total 3,801 3/402 89.5 399 10.5
a3ource of Tables 8 and 9: Renegotiation Board,
Thirteenth Annual Report
, p . 12.
TABLE 9
AMOUNT OF DETERMINATIONS
(In Millions of Dollars)
By Agree- & of By % of
Total ment Total Order Total
Through June 30,
1967 $952.44 $682.33 71.6 $2?0. 11 28.4
Fiscal Year 1968 23*07 6.20 26.9
__16._87 73.1
Total $975.51 $688.53 7075" $286.98 29/4
U.S., Code of Federal Regulations , sec. 1472. 3. See
also Renegotiation Board, Thirteen!.}) Annual Report, p. 4.
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There are three types of cases that can be reassigned
from the regional level to the headquarters Board: (1) all
class A cases, regardless of the regional board's determina-
tion, (2) class B cases which involve unilateral orders,
whether or not appealed by the contractor, and (3) any case
that the Board desires to review, regardless of the class.
Class A and B cases which are forwarded to the Board
are assigned to oiie of the divisions at headquarters. The
division looks over the record of the case to date and makes
additional requests for information if deemed necessary. The
contractor has another chance to appear and is usually issued
a "Notice of Points for Presentation." The Notice advises the
contractor of the particular items that the division will take
up at the conference and requests that the contractor be ready
with such information as well as anything additional he would
like to present. After the meeting, the division submits to
the full Board its recommendations for disposition of the case.
The Board is in no way constrained by what has happened
previously at the divisional or regional board level and can
clear the contractor, or increase or decrease the detcrmina-
2
tion of excessive profits against him.
At this headquarters stage, the contractor has the
choice of making an agreement with the Board or appealing the
ruling to the Tax Court of the United States. The contractor
has ninety days in which to file an appeal with the court, and
U.S., Code
'




failure to do so automatically voids any other avenue of
appeal. Appeals to the Tax Court have not been "very numerous
or profitable to the contractors. Tables 10 and 11 provide
data on cases appealed.
TABLE 10
RENEGOTIATION CASES IN THE TAX COURT*
Total Dis- Closed by Closed by Re- Pend-
Filed missed Stipulation determination ing
Through June 30,




Total 152 53 35 32 32
aSource for Tables 10 and 11: Renegotiation Board,
Thirteenth Annual Report
, pp . 13-14.
TABLE 11
TAX COUiiT ACTION OK BOARD DETERKINATIONS
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00 O -P
Court Action £ w £ °g
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•d •H •H d
1-1 H <M <h :•:
ctf 0) •H .h5
•d£-p St T3
ft O
Eh p S SIP
Dismissal 53 53 •• •• $ 49,157,525 H9, 157. 525
Stipulation 35 2 4 29 83,093,411 ?4, 464,056
Redetermination
_3£ 1? 2 1J_ 33, 46 '5, 000 J3JM12°j_000
Total 120 72 6~ "42" 165,715,936" $155,717,581
There have been 120 cases decided in the Tax Court, and
the court has upheld $155 million of the amount originally
•^Renegotiation Act of 195,1, sec. 108.
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requested by the Board. Although there have been forty-two
cases in which the amount was "modified downward," the $10
million represented is not a great amount when compared to the
§165 million originally requested.
A 1962 amendment to the Act of 1951 provided that
appeals of Tax Court decisions could be made to The United
States Courts of Appeals on questions of law only. To date, no
such appeals have been made.
As mentioned before, the proceedings of renegotiation
at both the headquarters and regional level are confidential
and not open to anyone except Board members and the contractor
under consideration. Transcripts are not released and the
public rarely finds out the names of companies that are under-
going and have undergone renegotiation. For many years, the
contractor himself was not even allowed a written statement of
why excessive profits were attributed to him, but now the Re-
negotiation Regulations state that a contractor is entitled to
a statement of why a particular ruling was reached at any level
2in the proceedings. However, this statement is not admissible
in court as proof of anything connected with renegotiation.
The pxiblic does become aware of renegotiation proceed-
ings when an appeal is made to the Tax Court. Here the pro-
ceedings are open and published as in most other courts of law.
Publicity during a court appeal is an intangible benefit to
either the contractor or the Board. Most of the publicity
Renegotiation Act of 1951* sec. 108A as amended by
P.L. 87-520, 87th Cong.
2U.S., Code of Federal Regulations, sec. V\72.J>-V\-72 A.
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seems to emanate from the aggrieved contractor, and if the con-
tractor reaches the public first with his arguments, the Board
is usually forced on the defensive. A famous case which made
trade press headlines back in the 1950' s was that of the
Boeing Airplane Company.
In 1955 » Boeing was ordered by the Board to refund $10
million in excess profits realized on contracts in 1952. This
determination was made by the full Board after the Los Angeles
Regional Board had cleared the company. Boeing appealed the
order to the Tax Court in November, 1955 » and made the most of
the attendant publicity. William Allen, president of the
company said, "I submit that there is no surer way to kill
incentive than to have one branch of the government offer a
contractor increased earnings for superior performance and
then have another branch of the government take those earnings
2
away several years later." The company also cited the Board's
lack of consistency in determinations and its supposedly
unorthodox use of several criteria in evaluating net worth.
Other aircraft companies joined Boeing in publicly speculating
as to what procedures the Board was following when it over-
3turned the regional board's decision.





"Renegotiators Ordered Industry to Refund f>33»6
Million in 1957," Aviation Week, December 30, 1957, p. 24.
3
-X, J. McAllister, "Renegotiation Confuses Profit Out-
look," Aviation Week, , November 7» 1955. PP« 12-13. See also:
G. J. McAllister, "reversals Blur Renegotiation Picture,"
Aviation Week , November 14, 1955, PP- 18-19, and Robert Rotz
,




The Board tried to counter the adverse publicity by
having the Director of the Office of Review, Carl Huyette,
state that "there can't possibly be a definite yardstick under
the Act that we must administer. Every case is completely
different with new factors and circumstances that \-7e must base:
our rulings on."
In this case, publicity notwithstanding, Boeing was
ordered to refund not the $10 million originally determined,
but $13 million. It was apparent that the Tax Court had looked
at the case more closely than the Board originally had, and
that perhaps publicity was not as beneficial as some may have
thought.
In an editorial entitled "Study in Contrasts," The
Nation reported that the incident should have received publica-
tion in the lay press as well as the trade press in order that
the exploitation of the government and the taxpayers by Boeing
be disseminated to all the taxpayers. The point made was that
apparently the ordinary citizens were interested only in
matters of "blood, underwear, and sports," and they could care
less .about matters of law. The final comment was that due to
the wholesale lack of interest in the whole affair, the elected
Representatives would probably change the Renegotiation Act to
2
make this type of exploitation legal and proper.
The final step in the renegotiation process is the
actual collection of the excessive profits due. Section 105(b)
McAllister, "Renegotiation Confuses Profit Outlook,"
p. 12.
2
"Study in Contrasts," Th ;




of the Act of 1951 delineates the methods of eliminating
excessive profits:
(A) by reductions in the amounts otherwise payable to
the contractor under contracts with the Departments, or
by other revision of their terms;
(B) by withholding from amounts otherwise due to the
contractor any amount of such excessive profits;
(C) by directing any person having a contract with
any agency of the Government, or any subcontractor there-
under, to withhold for the account of the United States
from any amounts otherv,Tise due from such person or such
subcontractor to a contractor, or subcontractor, having
excessive profits to be eliminated, and every such person
or subcontractor receiving such direction shall withhold
and pay over to the United States the amounts so required
to be withheld;
(D) by recovery from the contractor or subcontractor,
or from any person or subcontractor directed under sub-
paragraph (C) to withhold for the account of the United
States, through payment, repayment, credit, or suit any
amount of such excessive profits realized by the con-
tractor or subcontractor or directed Under subparagraph
(C) to be withheld for the account of the United States;
or
(S) by any combination of these methods, as is
deemed desirable.
1
The process seems fairly complicated, judging from the
language of the law, but the collection procedure is actually
fairly simple. The Board directs the Secretary of the Depart-
ment involved to collect the excessive profits from the con-
tractor. The Secretary then applies one of the above methods,
and the money recovered (if cash) is assumed by the Treasury a:
Miscellaneous, receipts. If the money is recovered in the form
of withheld payments, the appropriation of the particular
2department is reduced accordingly. The purpose of this pro-
cedure is to insure that no one department benefits from a




contractor's having to refund excessive profits.
One point that should be made is that all recoveries
of excessive profits are made after credit for incoirie tax is
allowed to the contractor. Renegotiation is a be fore -tax
process--a fact that has caused considerable complaint over the
years. While the Board may show determinations of, say, $15
million during a year, the actual amount recovered by the gov-
ernment may be $8 million or less, depending on the tax rate.
Although proceedings before the Board may result in
many millions of dollars refunded to the government, there is
yet another way the benefits of the Renegotiation Act are
received. This is through the voluntary refunds and price
reductions made to the government by the contractors. In fis-
cal 1967, the amount involved was approximately $3° million, or
some $15 million more than the excess profits determined by the
Board. 2 For fiscal 1968, the figures were $15 million and $23
3
million, respectively. These price reductions and refunds are
wholly voluntary and are to be distinguished from reductions
made under the terras of price-redeterminable contracts. It
would. be naive to say that the Renegotiation Act alone was 'the
sole cause of the reductions, but its effect cannot be dis-
counted. Some $1.3 billion has been refunded in this way
since 1951; however, there may be an even larger, though
"Ibid., sec. 105(b)(8).
'Renegotiation Board, Twelfth Annual Report
,
p. 9.




non-estimable figure involved in another facet of the deterrent
effect of the Act. Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, testified to this point in 3.966:
One of the most important results of this law lies
in the restraints it imposes upon contract pricing. Pro-
curement officials have told us repeatedly that renego-
tiation has aided in the negotiation of closer prices,
especially in the subcontract areas not subject to direct
government control. The contractor who knows excessive
profits will have to be refunded is more likely to agree
to what we might later describe as a reasonable price.
As I have already indicated, there is no way to
ascertain the savings that accrue to the government as a
result of the deterrent influence exerted by renegotia-
tion, but there is every reason to believe that the
amount may be large .1
Results
This section will be devoted to presenting certain
tables which illustrate the magnitude of the task which the
Renegotiation Board has had to perform during its existence.
Table 12 indicates the amounts that the Board determined as
excessive profits over a l6~year period.
The total amount indicated in Table 12 includes State
income tax adjustments, but not credits for Federal income tax.
The net recoveries to the government through June 30. 1968,
have been $382,706,358. This may. seem a small sum indeed when
compared to the World War II net figure of $k billion, but it
should be recognized that procurement policies and procedures
have improved, thus resulting in closer cooperation with and
supervision of contractors. The variance in the 'yearly deter-
minations has caused much discussion, especially in Congress.
As quoted by Lawrence Kartwig in House, Extension of

























Note: The above total includes determina-
tions of 333,185,470 made pursuant to the





The Board has answered most of the questions concerned with
these variances by referring interested persons to the follow-
ing paragraph in the Thirteenth Annual Report:
The annual record of determinations for the period
covered in the foregoing table Qrable 12] vias influenced
by several factors. As late as 1958, determinations
made by the Board reflected the high profits attributable
to the emergency procurement conditions of the Korean
conflict. In the early part of the period, cost-plus-a-
fixed-fee contracts (which generally carry lower profits
than other types of contracts) were used on a relatively
small scale. Subsequently, however, the use of such
contracts increased. Thus, although in recent years
procurement agencies curtailed the use of CPFF contracts,
CPFF sales still represented 14.3 per cent of the total
of $38.8 billion renegotiable business reviewed by the
Board in fiscal 1968. Another factor was the curtail-
ment of the Board's jurisdiction through increases in
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the statutory floor and the enactment of various
exemptions.-*-
Tables 13 and 14 show to some extent the continuing
effects of a changing procurement policy. The percentage of
CPFF contracts declined from 18.2 per cent in fiscal year 1967
to 14.3 per cent in fiscal 19&8, and the incentive-type con-
tracts shown in Table 14 have become voluminous enough to be
removed from the "other' ! category appearing in previous reports.
It would seem to indicate that procurement agencies are moving
toward use of fixed-price and incentive contracts and away from
the cost-plus type.
Out of the $38.7 billion in renegotiable sales reviewed
last year, $35*2 billion, 02: 91 per cent, involved contractors
that reported net renegotiable profits, and $3*5 billion, or 9
per cent, involved contractors that reported net losses. The.
comparable figures for fiscal 19&7 were $28.9 billion (87.3 per
cent) and $4.2 billion (12.7 per cent). Thus there has been a
decline from 1967 to 1968 in the amount of "loss" sales. The
number of "loss" contractors has also declined from 735 in
fiscal I967 to 676 in fiscal 1968. Caution must be exercised
in trying to prove the profitability of defense business by
comparing these figures, however. As the Board states:
Renegotiable business, as a whole, is composed of
manufacturing, construction, service, and other activities
connected with the national defense and space programs,
often undertaken on contract terms which difTer from
terms used in commercial business, and under' different
circumstances. These activities are carried on by a
" Renegotiation Board, Thirteenth Annual Report
, p. 11.
For an interesting interchange between Chairman Hartwig and
Representative James Burke (Mass.) on this point, see: House,
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variety of companies that are either wholly, partially,
or only nominally in the defense or space fields. The
commercial operations of such companies may or may not
be comparable to their renegotiable business. Moreover,
the statutory floor and various exemptions in the Act
annually exclude from renegotiation several billions of
dollars of defense sales of unknown profitability.
These factors, together with wide variances in the profit
experience of contractors, significantly limit the value
of any generalization, on the basis of the data reported
here, about the profitability of defense business as a
whole or of the §3Q*8 billion of renegotiable sales
reviewed by the Board in fiscal I968.-1-
The Board has apparently felt it necessary to insert the
above paragraph after the data on renegotiable sales in the
annual report because there has been a continuing controversy
over just what defense producers make as a profit compared to
private industry. For every study that claims that defense
profits are too high, there can be found another that says
defense profits are too low. The Board is caught in the middle
and thus must try to take a neutral position by merely reporting
2the facts and withholding public interpretation of them.
One final statistic to present concerning results of
renegotiation is that since the Board's inception, expenses
3
attributable to its operation have been some $52.9 million.
For the last six years, the Board has been averaging approximate'
ly 5?2.5 million per year. Proponents of the Board have added
the after- tax recoveries to the government from renegotiation
,? million) plus the after- tax savings from voluntary price
Ibid., p. 10.
2 One of the most widely quoted studies showing that
defense producers make lower profits than anyone else is
Logistics Management Institute, Defense Industry Profit Bevi
LKI Task 66-2 5 ( Washington , D . C . : LM] ", ' 1967).
-^Renegotiation Board, Thirteenth Annual Report , p. 15.
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reductions and refunds ($537 million) and have divided by tl
expenses of the Board (§52.9 million) to arrive at a ratio of
about $17 of recoveries to each dollar of Board expense. But
this figure is not entirely free of objection. Representative
Charles Gubser (Calif.) has stated that for the years I963 to
I967, renegotiation resulted in a net loss to the government.
He bases this estimate on an assumption that the cost of prepar-
ing and processing renegotiation filings is .06 per cent of the
[ renegotiable sales. By manipulating this cost factor, Gubser
comes up with a net loss of $27.7 million to the taxpayer.
Thus the controversy as to exactly what the actual results of
renegotiation are continues on.
Summary
The Renegotiation Act of 1951, enacted March 23, 19*51,
was derived from the previous Renegotiation Acts of World V.'ar II.
The Act created, as a new agency of the executive branch of the
Government, the Renegotiation Board. The Board, composed of
five members and (initially) several hundred supporting person-
nel, was a direct descendant of the War Contracts Price Adjust-
ment Board, and is theoretically more independent than the
latter agency.
The Board is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and has
two regional boards to assist in the processing of cases. The
number of personnel attached to all the boards has varied from
a high of 742 in fiscal 1953 to a low of 1?8 in fiscal 1967.
Historically, increases in personnel have lagged behind
House, Extension of Renegotiation Act, Hearing s , p . 68.
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increases in workloads. Since the Board has been a temporary
agency since its inception, Congress has not responded to its
needs in as timely a manner as with permanent agencies.
The Board has also had trouble attracting public support
for its operations due to its behind-the-scenes nature. Renego-
tiation is a confidential process, and the public does not often
learn of the Board's specific accomplishments in individual
cases except through cases appealed to the Tax Court.
Renegotiation applies on a total basis to contractors
having more than $1 million of renegotiable sales with any of
several government agencies during a fiscal year. The law is
replete with exemptions that may be self-applied by the con-
tractors or granted by the Board. The application of the vari-
ous exemptions, along with the floor of $1 million, operate to
relieve many contractors from renegotiation.
In addition to being confidential, the renegotiation
process is also fairly complicated. There are normally four
steps or phases involved:
1. A contractor files a form (KB FORM 1) with the Board
in Washington.
2. The Board reviews the filing and either clears it or
assigns it for further processing to one of the regional boards.
3. The regional board gathers additional evidence and,
depending on whether it is a class A or B case, will make a
final determination or will recommend to the full Board what the
disposition of the case should be. The contractors can appeal
unilateral decisions of the Board to the Tax Court, and, in cer-
tain circumstances, to the United States Courts of Appeal.
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h. Once a case is finalized, the collection of exces-
sive profits is made by any of several methods.
Voluntary price reductions and refunds account for a
sizeable proportion of the amount the government receives from
operations under the Renegotiation Act. There may be even a
larger amount received in the form of better contract pricing
due to the deterrent effect of the law.
Results of renegotiation are not easy to determine.
Depending on which viewpoint is held, monetary results can vary
from positive to negative. What may be the only true test of
the results of renegotiation is the fact that it is still lav;,





This chapter will review some of the major problems
associated with the Renegotiation Act of 1951« Different views
will be presented with the objective of trying to show that
there is no simple, clear-cut, entirely acceptable solution to
all the problems of renegotiation. Most of the problems dis-
cussed are not ne:.r ; the same ones have been discussed in
practically every hearing before Congressional committees con-
cerned with renegotiation since 19*1-2. Some of the protagonists
have changed, however. For instance, since 1951 the aerospace
industries have assumed from the weapons and munitions producers
a role as the most powerful and influential industry voice in
matters of renegotiation. Supporters of renegotiation have
changed somewhat also. During the 1950' s, the Defense Depart-
ment-was an avid and enthusiastic proponent of renegotiation,
and, in fact, at several Congressional hearings, DOD witnesses
presented and justified the case for renegotiation. DOD still
supports renegotiation in principle, but has left the task of
presenting and justifying it to the Board and to some Members
of Congress.
The Defense Department is in a peculiar position with
respect to renegotiation. If DOD were to support it in a force'




The problems to be treated are not wholly separable, but
for purposes of discussion, two general classifications will be
used, following the presentation of Weston in his book,
Procurement and Profit Ren egotiation : (1) lack of standards,
and (2) unfair procedures.
The Problem of Standards
Under this classification can be grouped, the following
subproblems
:
1. Renegotiation lacks standards for defining exces-
sive profits.
2. Adequate rewards for efficiency have not been pro-
vided.
3. The limitations of cost accounting data require an
exercise of judgment for which the renegotiation process is not
equipped.
fact that the Department's procurement methods were not working
and that thus renegotiation was necessary to catch any mistakes
resulting. The Department does, however, support renegotiation
to a limited extent with the argument that it provides an over-
all view of a contractor's business in contrast to the contract-
by-contract review provided by the Department. In this connec-
tion, see the following: Letter to John J. Martin from J. M.
Kalloy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Procurement), in
House, Extension of Renegotiation Act. Hearings, 19 68, pp. 42-
^3; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on W ; and Means, Exten-
sion of the Renegotiation Act, Hearings before the Committee on
Ways and Means, House of Representatives, on the General Subject
of an Extension of the Renegotiation Act, 86th Cong., 1st sess.,
April 2?-29, 1959, pp. ^-48.
"J. Fred Weston, ed., Procurement and Profit Renegotia-
tion (San Francisco, Calif. : Wadsworth Publishing Company,
Inc., i960), pp c 7-11 This book is a compilation of the issues
and ideas that evolved from a discussion of background papers
presented at a seminar held on profit renegotiation at the
University of California, Los Angeles, on May 18-19, 1959. The
seminar was attended by representatives of industry, the aca-
demic world, and the Renegotiation Board.
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^. Practicable profit standards are available but not
used by the Renegotiation Board.
Each of these sub-problems will be discussed in turn.
Excessive Profits
Since the first Renegotiation Act (19^-2), there has been
controversy as to what precisely constitutes excessive profits.
The problem has two facets— one theoretical and the other prac-
tical. The theoretical aspect has to do with questions of how
to define excessive profits, and further, how to determine
whether a company meets the definition. The practical side
involves the actual end result of the determination: are the
profits really excessive, or, phrased another way, do the
refunds that are made by the companies affect their capital
position? As is evident, the dividing line between the two
sides is still indeterminate, and the questions are so closely
interrelated that the answer to one depends on the other.
By law, the Board is required to take into account six
statutory factors in its determination of excessive profits.
These' factors (enumerated in Chapter II) have not changed since
their adoption into law in 19^3> A common criticism has been
that no specific v;eight has been attached to the six factors.
In other xv'orcls, some feel that more attention should be given
to the "efficiency" factor (for example) rather than to the
2








reccommended in 1959 by the Department of Defense which provided
for the Board to indicate in any statement given to the con-
tractor its "consideration of, and the recognition given to, the
efficiency of the contractor or subcontractor and each of the
foregoing factors."
Included in the same amendment was the proposed addition
of a seventh factor:
Types and provisions of contracts with the Departments
and subcontracts, with particular regard to contractual
pricing provisions and the objectives sought to be
achieved thereby, including especially, in the case of
contracts and subcontracts containing provisions for
incentive payments, the nature and extent of cost re-
ductions effected thereunder and the extent to which such
reductions are the result of the efforts of the contractor
or subcontractor.
2
This proposed factor was partially designed to amelio-
rate the complaints of contractors and industry officials that
the incentive profits they were rightfully earning under DOD
contracts were being taken away by the Renegotiation Board on
3the basis of its aggregate review. This proposal would also
have the effect of having the Board do a contract-by-contract
review of a contractor's business—a procedure for which renego-
tiation was not designed.
Thomas Coggeshall, Chairman of the Renegotiation Board
1 2Ibid
. ,
p. 3« J bi d
.
3This controversy had its beginning in the Boeing case
previously referred to and was furthered along by other aircraft
companies that claimed the Board did not properly recognize
their incentive profits. For a discussion of this point, see:
"Renegotiators Ordered Industry to Refund $33 • 6 Million in
1957," PP. 2^-25; Kotz, "The Renegotiation Puzzle," p. I58;
"Proposed Renegotiation Changes Broaden Industry Appeal Rights,"
Aviation Week, May 18, 1959, p. 29; "Bill to Extend Renegotia-





in 1959 i stated the following concerning adoption of the pro-
posed factor:
The Renegotiation Board has always endeavored to give
proper consideration to the pricing objectives of the
contracting parties, but I agree that the matter is of
sufficient importance to warrant its being denominated
a separate factor of equal dignity with the others
enumerated in the lav/.
I
Two years later, however, the Board's position was that
the amendment was unnecessary since the substance of it had been
n 2incorporated in the Board's regulations in 195° • " The amend-
ment was not passed in 1959* nor have similar ones been passed
to date.
The present position of the Board concerning the statu-
tory factors is related in the Thirteenth Annual Report:
It is apparent from the statutory language that no
formulae or pre-established rates can be used to determine
whether profits are, or are not, excessive in any given
cast. Rather, the determination in each instance must
reflect the judgment of the Board on the application of-
each of the statutory factors to the facts of the case.
The above statement is purposely broad, but not unreason-
ably so, according to Chairman Hartwig:
The Act sets forth these factors which are good
economic factors. The broad provisions enable the Board
Thomas Coggeshall, "Basic Principles of Renegotiation,"
in Procurement and Profit Renegotiation, p. ^8.
2 U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation, Report on the Renegoti
a
tion Ac t of 1951 » H • Doc. 322,
87th Cong., 2d sess., 196*2, p. 76, The 1959 House Hearings con-
tain letters from the Renegotiation Board to contractors that
supposedly fulfill the requirements of the law and of the pro-
posed amendment. The section on efficiency will present some
of these letters. The citation is House, Extension of the Re-
negotiation Act, Hearings , 1959, pp. 230-2*52".
3




to carry out the national policy against excessive
profits in such a manner that the efficient producer,
the reasonable cost producer, is not penalized. . . .
In other words, the act is purposely broad so that the
Board may differentiate between the efficient and the
inefficient producer, the high-cost and the low-cost
producer. This is one feature of this act that makes
it equitable, and is one reason why renegotiation has
withstood the test of time, more than 25 years, as com-
pared with a flat profit limitation statute such as
Vinson-Traramell, which is repressive.
This kind of statute is not repressive. It is a
judgment operation, but I think sometimes that we have
not sufficiently emphasized the fact that there are
analytical tools available for analyzing the reasonable-
ness of profits.
Just to illustrate what I mean, usually when excessive
profits arise there is a sudden or abnormal change in the
ratios that businessmen look at to determine whether
profit is fair. "when vie see a change or increase in
ratios we go into the factors to determine why it occurred.
If an increase in profit occurred as a result of the
contractor's efficiency, the act says we must take this
into account. If the increase in profit resulted from
lower cost, we must take this into account. ... It
isn't as difficult as it may seem because when you look
at the ratios you have a flag immediately and you z° into
the case, and investigate and study it, and you determine
by comparison of this company with its past, this company
with its competitors, whether under the factors—after
giving the contractor full credit for contribution to the
defense effort, efficiency, reasonableness of costs, et
cetera—whether it has made excessive profits or deserves
a clearance,
^
In other words, the Board uses other tools besides the
statutory factors in reviewing a case before it, and these tools
compensate somewhat for the lack of preciseness in the factors.
The industry view of the statutory factors is, as may be ex-
pected, quite the opposite from the Board's. The Machinery and
Allied Products Institute testified to this point in 1959:
Although the statute enumerates a list of factors to
be taken into consideration, there is no indication of
relative importance as among these factors. Inherently,
the factors are so broad in their terms and the grant of





discretion so unlimited that for all practical purposes
no restrictions are placed on the Board. By its very
nature the process of determining excessive profits is
fundamentally and inescapeably arbitrary.
In an individual case, for example, a contractor in
discussions with the Board may stress efficiency and
cost saving to the Government; the Board makes a refund
determination; the contractor in a later hearing argues
that efficiency and cost saving have not been rewarded
at all, or to a proper degree; the Board contends the
factor has been given due weight. How can this difference
of opinion be settled in the Tax Court or anywhere else?
And even more important, how can the contractor prevail
on court appeal when he has the burden of proof as to the
Renegotiation Board's determination and confronts grounds
which he cannot ascertain.!
Chapter III made reference to the fact that there is
conflicting opinion as to whether or not excessive profits
really exist in defense-oriented industries as compared to
other industries. Added to this question is that of whether or
not the refunds that are made by companies that have undergone
renegotiation have harmed them in any way. "Diwivz the hearings
in 1959* the Board submitted a series of statistical exhibits
which showed for the years 1950-55 the effect of renegotiation
refunds upon the earnings and net worth of each of the ten lead-
ing airframe manufacturers.
The renegotiation refunds reduced the total of $586
million profits by $53 million, while the combined net worth of
all the companies increased :;338 million, or 113 per cent,
during the five-year period. This increase was after the pay-
ment of all dividends, taxes, renegotiation refunds, and sale''
of capital stock. Another interesting statistic is that the ten
companies were able to increase their renegotiable sales from





£828 million In 3 950 to $4.5 billion in 1955 with an investment
of only %\S5 million in contractor-owned fixed assets. On the
other hand, government-owned fixed assets which were provided
to the companies increased ?533 million during the same period.
Based on the above information (and much other data not
repeated here) , the Board concluded that the financial positions
of none of the companies was in any way jeopardized by renego-
tiation refunds, and that the defense contractors were making
2
more on their investment that non-defense contractors.
I
The president of the Machinery and Allied Products
Institute, Charles W. Stewart, presented data at the same hear-
ings which showed in his words "generally lower profit levels."
Table 15 shows these data.
Stewart's point was that the figures show that profits
for the machinery industry have been steadjfly declining sine:
the pre-Korean War period and that this was indicative of the
fact that there were no excess profits in these industries.
To bring the practical question of defense industry
profits up to date, two more authorities will be cited. One,
which is used by most opponents of renegotiation, is the 196?
study done by the Logistics Management Institute, a non-profit
research organization retained by former Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara. The following is the first paragraph from the
"Summary Findings" of the study:
1. The average profit as a per cent of capital
investment, of high and medium volume companies, has
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business than on their commercial business and also
lower than the average profit on capital of companies
included in the FTC-SEC sample. The trend of profits
on defense business of these companies since 1958 has
been downward while that on their commercial business
and the FTC-SEC sample has been upward.
Net profit on Total Capital Investment (TCI) was
6.9 per cent on defense business in 1966. The corre-
sponding ratio for defense contractors 1 commercial
business was 10.8 per cent. . . .
Between 1958 and 1966 defense profit/TCI ranged
from a high of 10.2 per cent in 1958 to a low of 6.3
per cent in 1964 and stood at 6.9 in 1966.
Profit to TCI on the commercial business of defense
contractors ranged from a low of 4.7 per cent in I96I
to a high of 11.6 uer cent and stood at 10.8 per cent
in 1966. 1
The opposite view is taken by Murray Wiedenbaum of
Washington University. In a study he conducted he found that
defense contractors typically show a relatively low profit rate
on sales, but their return on investment is high because they
have large infusions of government-provided equipment and cap!--
tal (o±4.y billion in 19^7) • ~ His sample of big dufenso u^:.i
panies showed a 17 « 5 Per cent return on investment in the period
I962-65. The comparable ratio for non-defense contractors was
10.6 per cent.
The main point of the preceding discussion is that pro-
fit figures show, basically whatever the user wishes them to. A
layman without 'an accounting background would be hard pressed to
try to correlate any of the totals and other information that
As quoted in House, Extension of Renegotiation Act
.
Hearings, 1 9 68, p. 102.
2William K. Wyant, Jr., "Can Defense Profiteering Be
Halted? Experts Wonder," The Pilot, January 25, 1969, p. 8.
See also William K. Wyant, Jr., "Control of Defense Industry
Profits," The Pilot, January 11, 1969, p. 8.
3
"Trank C. Porter, "Defense Contractors Make More, Hil]
Told," The Washington Post, November 12, 1968, p. A2.
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has been presented either in this paper or in the various
hearings before Congress. Generally, each major witness that
appears for each side during the hearings has had unimpeachable
data showing either the lack of, or surplus of, profits attributed
to defense industries, or manufacturing in general. Probably in
most cases the data that are presented to the Committee members
are true--at least in relation to the purpose for which the data
was originally collected. However, by changing terminology, it
is entirely possible to reduce profits to losses where there
were originally "excessive profits." The following view of
Admiral Riokover could be applied to either side in the renego-
tiation fight without much loss of credibility:
Profits are not necessarily what they seem to be,
particularly when based on data volunteered by con- -.
tractors who may exploit the figures as they choose.
Efficj ency
Efficiency is one of the statutory factors and, as such,
is closely related to the problem of excessive profits pre-
viously discussed. However, a separate section is accorded this
factor because it has been the subject of so much debate over
the years.
The excerpt of the Renegotiation Act of 1951 which, deals
with efficiency is as follows:
In determining excessive profits favorable recogni-
tion must be given to the efficiency of the 'contractor or
subcontractor, with particular regard to attainment of
quantity and quality production, reduction of costs, and
economy in the use of materials, facilities, and manpower.
Wyant, "Can Defense Profiteering be Halted?" p. 8.
2Renegotiation Act of 1951 , sec. 103(e).
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The main questions concerned with the efficiency problem
have been the alleged lack of reward given to the contractors
because of their efficiency, and further, the incentive impair-
ment due to the lack of reward.
From the earliest days of the Act of 1951- . th e Board
has tried to convince contractors that they will be suitably
rewarded for their cost-cutting and other processes of effi-
ciency. In an interview conducted with a Board member in 1952,
Aviation Week determined that a defense contractor that demon-
strates unusual efficiency, with resultant savings to the
government, would reap an award according to his achievement.
Barron K. Grier, representing the Aircraft Industries
Association, testified in 1959 before the Ways and Means Commit-
tee that although the Boards appeared to be giving favorable
recognition to the efficiency factor, there did not appear to be
any reward for this efficiency. He submitted for the record
letters received by several aircraft companies from the Renego-
tiation Board which outlined the basic reasoning for the Board's
determinations. Excerpts pertaining to the efficiency question
follow:
(Letter dated March 22, 195? to North American Aviation,
Inc . )
Efficiency
The contractor's long established record of low cost
production as measured by man-hours per pound expended is
again present in the year under review and this fact is
"Efficiency Will Pay in Renegotiation, " Aviation Week,
June 16, 1952, p. 49.
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confirmed by procurement agencies.
(Letter dated July 12, 1957 to Lockheed Aircraft Cor-
poration)
Effici ency
The contractor has delivered a wide variety of high-
quality products. It has also demonstrated a good con-
trol over utilization of manpower and materials.
2





The contractor is recognized as a producer of high-
quality products with a record of maintaining delivery
schedules. It has satisfactorily demonstrated a good
control of manpower and materials.
3
These segments of the letters to the various companies
are essentially similar in that they are generalized, short, and
non-committal as to the reward to be received by the contractor.
It was letters such as these that prompted contractors and
others to back the amendment proposed in 1959 that would require
more definite recognition of efficiency in letters to the con-
tractors. The Board did not wait for the amendment, however.
The following letter is reproduced as a representative sample of
the type of letters that the contractors began receiving
approximately one year after the above letters were received:
(Letter dated June 10, 1958 to North American Aviation,
Inc. )
Efficiency
The contractor states that comparisons of its fighter
planes production performance with the 195^ industry
'House, Extension of the Renegotiation Act, Hearing s
,
1959, P. 237.
2 Ibid., p. 2^5. 3I.bid., p. 252.
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average indicate, in terms of the standard industry
measure of efficiency--man-hours per airframe pound--
that it was at least 10 per cent more efficient than
the average aircraft manufacturer at comparable points
in production on comparable programs.
The contractor also states that its more efficient
productj.on performance was achieved despite labor
shortages involving certain essential skills, rising
wage rates, and higher material costs.
Comment: The contractor's claims to efficiency, as
measured by labor man-hours per pound of airframe, have
been verified by procurement agencies.
The contractor has submitted examples of its effi-
ciency in the year under review which it claims are
capable of measurement as dollar savings, as follows:
1. Economy in buying through combining purchase
orders resulted in a savings of $10 million.
2. Encouraging competition and competitive practices
among its suppliers resulted in a .saving of $200,000 by
the placing of a new order for F-100 landing gear with a
second source.
3. Use of price redetermination contracts with
suppliers, utilizing cost analysis and learning curves,
resulted in refunds of $>2 million to the Los Angeles
division.
k. Use of multipurpose tools designed by the con-
tractor on one particular contract saved $36,000.
The Board has given consideration to these claims,





This letter is much longer, and more specific, than the
previous ones. 'However, it still is very non-committal. In
essence it is nothing more than a listing of the contractor's
claims and a statement that the Board has given them considera-
tion. Efficiency is recognized, but no weight is explicitly
attached to it. There was. a weight implicitly attached, however,
because of the fact that in all the companies listed, efficiency
was recognized favorably, and yet each company had, in the
opinion of the Board, excessive profits. In fact, all the
statutory factors were rated favorably for each company with the




the Board, because about 70 per cent of the total fixed assets
were government-supplied, the risk to each company was quite
low, thus offsetting the rewards for efficiency and the other
statutory factors.
The final paragraph from a letter to one of the aircraft
companies illustrates the point that while no specific quanti-
tative weight is attached to the application of the statutory
factors, there is nevertheless some type of weight attached,
(and this weight is determined most probably in the minds of the
members of the Renegotiation Board.
(Letter dated February 13 » 1959 to Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation)
Reasonableness of Profits
Notwithstanding the decrease in sales and profits
from the prior year and the contractor's acknowledged
efficiency and lowered costs, the Board has crone:*uded
that the conlrdi; Lor 5 s renegotiable profits, accompanied
as they were by substantial government assistance and
subcontracting as well as the minimal risks to which
the contractor was exposed by reason of 9^«9 P^*' cent
of its production being either CPPF or fixed price in-
centive, are
,
greater than can be considered reasonable.
2
The second part of the basic efficiency controversy is
incentive impairment. Contractors complain that under an incen-
tive contract they do their best to cut costs and save the gov-
ernment money .(while at the. same time making a larger profit),
only to have the Board take away these incentive profits as well
as part of their basic profits through renegotiation. It will
be recalled that earlier in this chapter mention was made of an
amendment proposed in 1959 to require the Board to take into
special consideration the types of contracts performed by
1Ibid.




companies that were subject to renegotiation. The following
testimony of Representative Carl Vinson pointed out why the
proposed amendment should not have been adopted:
Section 2(a) purports to set up an additional factor
pointed specifically at incentive-type contracts which
would require special consideration of these contracts.
I have already discussed with you the chart that shows
the profits made by seven of the airframe companies who
have incentive-type contracts and who today are appel-
lants in the Tax Court following decisions made by the
Renegotiation Board.
Now, these same companies obviously would benefit in
the future from the language contained in this proposed
section. But aside from these companies that can be
identified today, and others not identifiable, this
language would put incentive contracts in a different
status from other contracts as a source of excessive
profits. Special recognition suggests special exemp-
tions. This I oppose.
Under the present law, the Board is required to
consider cost reductions ond the efficiency of the con-
tractor.
That being the case, either this section is a devious
provision to give a special exemption or it is redundant
and unnecessary, since the same consideration of cost
reductions and contractor effort arc considered under:
existing law. 3-
The Ways and Means Committee recommended that the Rene-
gotiation Act be extended in 1959 for four years and, in disa-
greeing with this proposal, nine Republican members of the
Committee added some weight to the contractors 1 incentive
impairment complaints by saying that one of the serious problems
that had to be solved concerning renegotiation was that the
term "excessive profits" required further statutory
definition in light of the Renegotiation Board's
alleged practice of seeking to recapture normal
profits on contractually agreed-upon incentive profits.
-4bid., p. I89.
2
"Bill to Extend Renegotiation Act Protested by Republi-
can Group," Aviation Week , Kay 25, 1959, p. 30.
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This same incentive problem was afforded recognition by
the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation in its 19&2
study of renegotiation. However, the Committee declined to make
any specific recommendation about this problem, preferring
instead to recommend that the Act of 1951 be extended for only
a two-year period. The Committee's reasoning was that the Board
itself was conducting its own study of renegotiation and there-
fore would presumably come up with its own solutions to its own
problems.
The two opposing views concerning the stifling of incen-
tives to efficiency are best presented by the following excerpts
from papers presented at the renegotiation seminar held in 1959:
It is asserted that renegotiation stifles efficiency
and low-cost production. For purposes of illustration,
the proponents of this contention are prone to refer to
the Board's approach to incentive-type contracts. The
claim is made that the contractor, by introducing effi-
ciencies into his operations, cuts costs below the agreed
target level and thereby entitles himself under the con-
tract provisions to share in the resultant savings, only
to have the Renegotiation Board come along at a later
date and take back his entire "bonus for savings." . . .
I shall not belabor the point that an incentive contract
is no better than the target cost upon which the operation
of its incentive formula depends. Experience has shown
that target costs, which necessarily are based in part
upon estimates of future costs, are often substantially
inaccurate. Clearly, therefore, the possibility of ex-
cessive profits is present, and neither the incentive
contract in its entirety nor the incentive profits alone
should be exempted.
Suffice it also to say that incentive profits as such
are not eliminated by the Board. A determination of the
Board is based upon an evaluation of the contractor's
entire profits under incentive contracts' during the fiscal
year, not just the profits realized under the incentive
formula, and upon a review of profits from all other
renegotiable business performed by the contractor under




other types of contracts. Any numerical similarity
between incentive and excessive profits, if it exists
at all, is purely coincidental.
^
The most discouraging 'experience of the airframe
industry under renegotiation has revolved around incen-
tive profits. At the heart of the incentive-type con-
tract is the desire of the military to effect savings
in cost. Use of the incentive contract is based on the
hope that the ultimate cost to the government will be
less than it otherwise would be; and if it is less, the
profit allowed to the contractor will be greater. . . .
Major segments of the airframe industry have effected
substantial savings in cost to the government under
incentive contracts and at the same time, according to
the terms of their contracts, they have enhanced their
own profit position. This saving pleased the military,
but the Renegotiation Board, which is only interested
in profits, was not greatly impressed. To the Board, a
profit is a profit; whether it is a basic profit or an
incentive profit makes no difference. As a result, some
of the major companies in the airframe industry had
excessive profit determinations equaling and in some
cases exceeding their incentive earnings. The Board
maintains that this was just a coincidence. Nevertheless
the Board has often demonstrated an unfriendly attitude
toward incentive contracts and has at times minimized
their value by suggesting that an overstated target




A discussion of this problem can best be prefaced by a
statement by Gillette in his article, "Accounting Aspects of
Renegotiation": "The application of accounting principles . to
the renegotiation process produces a monstrosity because it is
3
an attempt to reconcile concepts that are irreconcilable."-^
Goggeshall, "Basic Principles of Renegotiation,"
pp. 51-5^'
William T. Darden, "Business Experience with Renegotia-
tion," in Procurement and Profit Renegotiation, p. 65.
-'Charles G. Gillette , "Accounting Aspects of Renegotia-




According to Gillette, there are four kinds of account-
ing concepts involved in the renegotiation process: (1)
generally accepted accounting principles which are the standard
principles employed by public accounting firms as well as most
private accountants; (2) income tax accounting wherein the firm
tries to legally delay the paying of taxes as long as possible;
(3) cost accounting wherein the cost of an article is known at
every stage of its production; and (^) the determination of con-
tract costs under military contracts.
The main complaint of the contractors appears to be that
since income tax accounting is usually done on an annual basis,
the government has therefore decided that renegotiation will
also apply on an annual basis and consequently "that the fair-
2
ness of income should be determined annually.
"
Gillette states the contractors' point of view as to
why yearly accounting and the renegotiation process do not mesh:
Representatives of the Department of Defense and the
contractors sit down together and make price determina-
tions or price redeterminations on contracts that run for
as long as five years. In so doing, they also take into
consideration performance and pricing on preceding con-
tracts and sometimes on anticipated follow-on contracts.
After this is done, renegotiation pulls out the fragment
of such a contract which happens to be accrued in a given
year, adds it to similar fragments of other contracts all
in a.ccordwith accounting principles differing from those
used by the parties in the contract negotiation, and then
makes a determination that the profits thereon are exces-
sive. On the basis of such determinations, we hear in
the halls of Congress that this proves the Department of
Defense is making mistakes in its pricing and that, there-
fore, the Government needs the renegotiation process to
protect itself from its mistakes. Yet, the accounting
considerations that entered into the accounting pricing







process. The two accountings can only be compared after
the fact—when it is too late to make intelligent use of
such comparison either in the contracting process or in
the renegotiation process.!
There are many technical problems involved with account-
ing and renegotiation. Perhaps the most difficult to solve is
that of the allocation of costs. The following example is
cited to show in simplified form part of the complexity of the
cost allocation problem and how this complexity can be inter-
preted incorrectly by the Renegotiation Board:
Consider the case of a contractor who is operating
his shop with 1000 people, working one shift on non-
i renegotiable business. The factory is producing tele-
vision sets at a cost of $100 per set and has long-term
commitments to deliver them at a price of $150.
The contractor then receives a renegotiable order
from the government for another product. In order to
perform the contract on schedule, our contractor hires
3,000 people and goes on a two- shift operation. He
transfers 75° of his original 1000 people to the re-
negotiable contract, so that his television sets are now
being produced by 250 experienced and 75® nGW hires.
The whole place is in chaos. However, we have a very
conscientious timekeeping organization which meticulously
counts the hours spent building television sets. When
these hours are priced out and other costs added, it
appears that the $150 television sets are costing $160
instead of $100.
Now it happens that the president of this company is
a genius and he anticipated all this right down to the
penny; so, when he made the bid that produced the renego-
tiable contract, he priced it high enough to absorb $60
times the number of television sets he was going to make
during the period of performance under the renegotiable
contract.
However, the accountant was just an accountant and he
charged all the hours . spent building television sets to
the television department and charged the renegotiable
contract with the hours spent performing, under it. When
reports were filed with the Renegotiation Board, they
showed a profit of 20 per cent on renegotiable sales and
a loss of 7 per cent on non-renegotiable business.
Anyone with a sharply pointed pencil could draw cer-




1. The bookkeeping v/as "accurate."
2. This was an inefficient contractor because he could
only make money when he was subsidized by the Gov-
ernment. (Look at his loss when he was competing
in the commercial television market.
)
3. The 20 per cent profit on the renegotiable business
was clearly excessive. (This contractor's normal
profit was minus 7 per cent.)
k. The Government had been robbed and should get its
money back.
5. The contracting officer who fixed the price on the ,
renegotiable business was either a knave or a fool.
In this example, the allocation problem worked to the
contractor's disadvantage. This is not always the case, accord-
ing to Admiral Rickover, who estimates that the government could
save two billion dollars annually by tightening up the way cost
2
and profit figures are worked out. In an appearance before
the House Committee on Banking and Currency in the fall of 1968,
Rickover stated:
We must have standard accounting practices so that the
government can learn what it actually costs to make an
article and what the actual profit is. The way it is
today, industry can change their accounting practices at
will and in any manner they wish. And, under the present
rules the government can't object and doesn't have the
people to check. . . .
We have no way of knowing whether the cost is proper
or whether it covers excess profit, subsidy for . . .
.commercial work, or both.
Today you don't know the cost or the profit. We only
know the total amount we pay. We simply. don't know what
we are doing.
3
The imposition of uniform accounting standards on all
contractors would be one way of attempting to get at the problem
of cost allocation, but there are many that feel the government
Ibid., pp. 112-13.




should put its own house in order first. There are presently a
myriad, of accounting systems in the agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment, and it has been only recently that the President has
directed that the entire government should go on an accrual
accounting basis; it is anticipated that this system will take
several years to develop and implement.
Practicable Profit Standards
i This topic can, in a sense, be considered as a further
facet of the excessive profits problem discussed earlier in the
section. The basic argument is that the Board has relied upon
the judgment of men in applying the statutory factors when
there has been available other, more reasonable and quantifiable
factors. Weston and Jacoby have conducted a study in which they
evaluated the earnings of the aircraft industry as compared to
2
other dynamic and growing industries in 1953. Their premise
was that because of the high risks involved, the profit rates of
the aircraft industry should at least approximate the rates of
other firms w3 th comparable risks. Four profit standards were
developed and applied to the industry to see at what level their
profits should have been for 1953* Table 16 shows the
The proposal for accrual accounting was one of a number
of recommendations made to President Johnson by his Commission
on Budget Concepts in 19^7 •
2Neil H. Jacoby and J. Fred 'Weston, "Profit Standards
for Renegotiation, 11 in Procurement and Profit Reneprotiatjon.
pp. 121-58.
3
^These standards were first publish ed in the Quarterly
Journal of Economics, LXVT (Kay, 1952), pp. 224-250.

-87-
earnings to sales rate actually received as compared with i b




RESULTS OF APPLICATION OF EARNINGS
STANDARD TO THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY®
Actual earnings rate on sales 6.0^%
Earnings on renegotiable sales (before taxes)
necessary to meet the four earnings standards:
I Equity financing standard 7.62;£
Market application standard 9.73,^
Historical earnings standard ... 7. 32^
j
Comparative earnings standard ... 9 •92.^
'Source: Jacoby and V/eston, "Profit Standards," p. 156.
One conclusion reached by Jacoby and Weston was that by
all standards, the profits for the aircraft industry in 1953
were inadequate. Another was that due to the lack of meaningful
standards in the procurement process, procurement officials had
been "unduly restrictive in the earnings they have permitted to
the aircraft industry."'
The greatest value that the authors see in these stand-
ards is the application of them in the initial pricing of con-
tracts and the continued application of them by the Board in the
renegotiation process. The standards would not be rigidly
applied through the use of automatic formulae, but would instead
be applied through the judgment of the persons involved. The
four standards would indicate a reasonable zone of profit for a








Essentially then, these standards would be guidelines to
the application of the statutory factors. They would still
depend on judgment to make them work, but theoretically they
would make the judgment decisions easier to make. The Board has
not officially adopted these standards or any others; it relies
on the judgment of men, applied to the statutory factors based
on the circumstances in each case. As has been mentioned be-
fore, however, the Board is not without tools with which to
apply its judgment. The basic function of the Office of the
Economic Advisor is to conduct the types of economic studies
/
s
and surveys which will be helpful to the Board in its delibera-
tions.
The Hatter of Procedures
Under this category can be grouped the following:
1. Proceedings before the Renegotiation Board.
2. Proceedings before the Tax Court of the United
States. ' »
Board Procedure
In the words of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation, "Widespread dissatisfaction has been expressed with
2
regard to present practice and procedure of the Board."
Practically any industry witness appearing before Congressional
committees has had something less than kind to say about the
"See the Organization Chart of the Renegotiation Board
which is reproduced in Chapter III,
2
House,' Report on Renegotiation, H. Doc. No. 322, p, 62.
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proceedings before the Board. Some examples follow:
. . .
the process of renegotiation can never be anything
but a wholly arbitrary one and one which defies rational
analysis or retrospective review by appellate courts.
1
Usually the hearing will cover a period of two or
three hours in the morning, sometimes running into the
afternoon. It generally consists of the contractor coming
in and giving his reasons as to why he thinks he has no
excessive profits.
The Board will ask questions from time to time.
• Rarely, if ever, does the Board bring out any of the facts
that it has obtained from other sources. I can almost say
categorically that it does not.
After the hearing is over, the Board retires and
usually on the same day comes back and says, "Mr. Contrac-
tor, your profits are excessive, in our opinion, by $10
million "--period.
There is no negotiation. Generally they will not even
discuss the matter with you. Nothing, I assure you, could
be more arbitrary than the way in which the Board's
decision is made. There is no negotiation, across the
table or otherwise.
2
Renegotiation is an arbitrary process, which is
neither necessary nor desirable in our free enterprise
economy. It places a premium on inefficiency and unsound
procurement administration, and it undermines the basic
philosophy of our free, competitive enterprise system.
3
There are essentially two types of grievances which are
commonly stated concerning Board procedure. One group consists
of those which are attributable to the lack of a clear and con-
cise definition of excessive profits and the other of those
attributable to the lack of certain procedural safeguards.
Since the excessive profit problem has already been discussed,
only the second type will be discussed in this section.
Charles W. Stewart in House, Extensi on 'of Renegotiation
Act, Hearings, 1959, p. 131.
2Barron K. Grier in ibid., p. 227.
3
^Robert R. Statham in House, Extension of the Renego-
tiation Act, Hearings, 1968, p. 203.
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Many different complaints are included in the procedural
safeguard category. The findings of the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation can be used to summarize these criti-
cisms.
One complaint has been that there is a lack of estab-
lished procedures for resolution of disputes as to questions of
lav: and fact. "Unlike procedures before the courts, there is
no requirement in the renegotiation statutes that the parties
make requests for findings of fact in order to frame issues on
/ 1questions of law and fact." To illustrate, one contractor v:ho
^appeared before the Joint Committee advised that he was unable
to get a hearing at the regional board level as to whether cer-
tain costs could be charged against renegotiable business. The
amount of these costs was several million dollars—an amount
that would have reduced the ultimate determination of excessive
profits to zero. The point made by the contractor was that a
"procedure for joinder and resolution of issues on questions of
law and fact should not be left • the discretion of the Board.
Another common complaint in this category concerns the
collection of evidence used by the Board. The Board may con-
sider any information it chooses from any source, regardless of
whether or not it would be admissible as evidence in a court of
law. The contractor is not entitled as a matter of right to
rebut this information (if written) or to hear and confront a
witness (if testimonial). The Board is not required to
House, Report on Renegotiation






disclose all the information it uses, but must reveal certain
parts of it when requested to do so by the contractor. The
Board has remained adamant, however, with respect to releasing
performance reports to contractors. These reports, along with
trade secrets, income tax data, and financial statements, are
all exempt from the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act which requires government agencies to make available most
of their information to the public.
A third grievance in this category has been directed
toward the actual decision-making process of the Board. Cases
'which are referred to the statutory Board from one of the
regional boards are usually handled by a one -member board con-
sisting of an Office Chief. It was found that in many in-
stances, there was free discussion between the statutory Board
members, the regional board members, and the staff members that
actually prepared the government's case. In other words, the
contractors have felt that they have not been receiving an
impartial review from the higher levels in the renegotiation
process. Their view is further reinforced by the fact that in
many cases the decisions made by the statutory Board and the
regional boards appear to have been pre-determined, as they were
p
announced only a few hours after meeting with the contractors.
Fourth, and finally, in this category is the complaint
that the Board is not required to, and in fact does not, keep a
Ibid . See also U.S., C ode of Federal Regulations , sec.
1^80.9 for a list of the exemptions permitted the Board.
2House, Report on Rene. ^1-iation , H. Doc. No. 322, p. 65.
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written record of all proceedings before it. Without a reco:>
,
according to the contractors, there is no basis for citing
errors of fact or lav; allegedly committed by the Board in the
event of subsequent proceedings in the Tax Court.
A few weeks before publication of the above criticisms,
the Board published a letter to the Committee which outlined a
new 'regulation to help "give renegotiation procedure clarity,
2
certainty and uniformity." This regulation contained certain
features which were a partial answer to the many critics and
criticisms of the renegotiation process:
(1) Provision is made for oral and written presenta-
tion of any issues or disputed matters of fact, law or
accounting, and for the resolution thereof.
(2) The regulation provides that a copy of the account-
ing section of the report of renegotiation will be fur-
nished to the contractor upon request.
(3) Provision is made in the regulation for a notice
of points for presentation, c <• . The r^^-r-nr^^^ n-r the
notice is to enable the contractor to prepare for the
meeting, and, in addition to presenting his entire case
as he sees fit, to address himself at such meeting to
particular points or matters with respect to which it is
believed that presentation will be helpful to the division
in its consideration of the case.
3
There were other changes in the Board procedures de-
signed to streamline the process, but the one change which was
earnestly desired by the contractors was vigorously opposed by
the Board. This change, embodied in an amendment to Public Law
86-89, and subsequently deleted in conference, would have
allowed contractors access to performance reports and other
1 Ibld.
2Letter from Renegotiation Board to Hon. Wilbur D.
Mills, December 21, 19ol, in House, Report on Renegotiation.






written data furnished to the Board. The Board's comments per-
taining to this amendment are worth quoting at length because
they represent the basic administration viewpoint on renegotia-
tion in general and this point in particular:
In our opinion the Renegotiation Act of 1951 contem-
plates, as did the predecessor statutes, that renegotia-
tion at the Board level is a purely administrative
activity, and adjunct to the procurement process; that the
Renegotiation Board is neither a judicial nor a quasi-
judicial nor a semi judicial body, but is rather an arm of
the Executive, seeking to eliminate excessive profits by
agreement with 'defense contractors; and that such opera-
tions of the Board are not adversary in character and
should not be burdened with the attributes of formal
litigation, but should remain informal.
The Board is of the opinion that there are other im-
portant reasons why this inspection provision is undesir-
able legislation. The claims for the production of docu-
ments misconceive the nature of renegotiation proceedings.
Whatever reasons may be thought to justify production of
Board documents in Tax Court cases, those reasons do not
apply to the proceedings conducted by the B6ard .- Tr the
informal nonadversary administrative proceedings at the
Board level, there is no more reason to require the Board
to open any part of its files for inspection by the con-
tractor than there is to require the Internal Revenue
Service to show its files to the taxpayer with whom it is
negotiating a deficiency assessment, or to require a con-
tracting officer to show his files to the contractor with
whom he is negotiating a contract redetermination or other
•price adjustment. In each of these instances, when the
initial informal . . . effort fails, machinery is avail-
able to the contractor to pursue his rights in another,
forum where he may have the full protection of formal,
adversary, tri air-type proceedings. . . .
Other objections to compulsory production of Govern-
ment performance reports are well known:
(a) If these internal reports were known to be subject
to inspection by the contractors to whom they relate, it
is not reasonable to expect that the departmental employ-
ees who prepare them would be as candid as the situation
requires.
(b) These reports . . , often contain references or
intimate information relating to other companies, includ-
ing competitors of the contractor, to which the contractor
is not entitled.
(c) Realistically it must be recognized that, if per-
formance reports were to be shown, their production would
often likely be followed by demands fror* contractors that
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the authors of the reports be summoned to appear at
.renegotiation conferences for confrontation and question-
ing. This in turn could easily lead to demands for sworn
testimony and a written record—and renegotiation would
cease to be administratively manageable.
1
It is evident that the Board is very much against having
to show its documents to anyone. The next discussion will show
the main reason why contractors vrould like to see them.
Tax Court Procedure
Critics have been no less outspoken of the Tax Court
procedure than of the Board procedure. Proceedings in the
court are supposed to be dc n
, „
v0 » as required by the law, and,
according to the Chief Judge of the Tax Court, the proceedings
are just that.
The trial before the Tax Court in a renegotiation case
i s a do novo proceeding, as the law requires. It is not a
review of the action of the Renegotiation Board. The Tax
Court decides each case solely on the basis of the evi-
dence introduced in the trial before it. The Tax Court
does not see or consider the proceedings of the renegotia-
tion Board or regard anything in those proceedings as
evidence before the Tax Court, with the possible
. exception
that some evidence introduced in the renegotiation pro-
ceedings might qualify as admissible evidence before the
Tax Court and be introduced into the Tax Court record by
one of the parties. . . .
The Tax Court has explained in its rules and opinions
that the contractor must assume the burden of the moving
party in the proceeding and if the proof before the Tax
Court is inadequate to support an independent determina-
tion, then of course the court ha.s to leave the parties
as it found them, that is, it cannot change the determina-
tion of the Renegotiation Board.
2
The contractors have found fault with the above proce-




2Letter from Chief Judge J. E, Murdock to Hon. Colin F,
Stam, Hay 15, 1961, in House, Report on Renegotiation , H. Doc.
Ho. 322, p. 12.
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fact, not de novo; and even if it were, the contractor should
not have to, and in fact cannot, prove that the Board's deter-
mination is erroneous because he has no actual knowledge of the
specific facts and documents which were used by the Board. One
writer has even stated that the Tax Court starts a renegotiation
case with the presumption that the decision of the Renegotiation
Board is correct and that the presumption can be rebutted only
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Further
argument advanced by Koehler to support his contention is that
the Tax Court has modified Board determinations only when it
has found what it considered to be arbitrary or unreasonable
actions and that the court has never cleared a contractor, whose
profits the Board has determined to be excessive, on the
2grounds of an improper application of the statutory factors.
(See Table 11 for Tax Court actions on Board determinations.)
Marcus, in his article, "Appropriate Public Policy for
Renegotiation," concluded of the Tax Court procedure that
The result of all this is that today the Tax Court
neither reviews completely the proceedings of the Board
to determine if error has been committed, as an appellate
body normally does, nor does it give a fresh full-scale
hearing to the firm that has boon determined to have
realized excessive profits.
3
The Board itself has generally refrained from comment on
Tax Court proceedings on the grounds that the Department of
Justice handles the renegotiation litigation once the Board
"John T. Koehler, "Renegotiation: Evidence and Burden












Renegotiation has spawned problems ever since its be-
ginning in 19^-2. Over the years the basic issues of controversy
have remained fairly stable; however, the proponents and
opponents have changed in some ways. Many of the problems are
interrelated, and at times, a statement of an industry or Board
representative can seemingly be applied to several different
problems.
i The "lack of standards" category was first discussed,
and within it can be loosely grouped the following: (1) exces-
sive profits definition and application, (2) lack of rewards
for efficiency, (3) inappropriateness of accounting procedures,
and ('!} f °.i1 ure to v^--- available profit standi rd s in evaluating
a company.
The controversy over the definition of excessive profits
has been a long-continuing one. Amendments to the law hove been
proposed which would quantify the factors used in determining
excessive profits and which would add another factor to the six
presently in use. None of these amendments have become law.
There is further controversy as to the effect of renegotiation
on the earnings of companies and as to the profitability of
defense industries as compared to other industries.
The efficiency problem has provoked almost as much dis-
cussion as that of excessive profits. The main problem has
been the apparent lack of reward for efficiency and the supposed
House, Report on Renegotiation, H. Doc. No. 322, p. 78.
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diminishlng of contractor incentives due to the alleged failure
of the Board to give "proper" consideration to the efficiency
factor. The Beard has denied industry contentions about this
problem.
The other two problems in the first category have not
received the attention that the first two have, but nevertheless
are frequent topics of discussion, particularly at industry
conferences and Congressional hearings.
The second classification treated has been that of
unfair procedures, including those before the Board and the Tax
Court. Industry has generally classified Board procedure as
"arbitrary" and has made several complaints concerning eviden-
tial procedure and the decision-making process of the Board.
The Board has changed some of its regulations to make the rene-
gotiation process more equitable and certain, but it has con-
sistently refused to make available for contractors' inspection
performance reports and other data of a confidential nature.
Proceedings before the Tax Court have been characterized
as riot being de novo, as required by law, and of being biased in
favor of the Renegotiation Beard. The Tax Court itself denies
these claims, and the Board has not issued a polic}' statement
on Tax Court procedure since it sees its responsibility in a
case as ending when the contractor appeals to the Tax Court.

CHAPTER V
THE FUTURE OF RENEGOTIATION
Introduction
The previous chapters have dealt with the history,
process, and problems of renegotiation. This chapter will out-
line some of the principal proposals for change to, or repeal
of, renegotiation and will conclude with a short summary of the
pro and con positions toward renegotiation.
Modi fication t o Renegotiation
There have been three main categories of proposals to
change the present renegotiation process:
1. Raise or lower the statutory "floor."
2. Increase or decrease the allowable exemptions.
3. Remove the renegotiation process back to the con-
tracting departments whence it came originally.
Raise or Lower the Statutory "r'loor"
The minimum amount' subject to renegotiation was raised
in 1953 to $500,000 and in 1956 to §1 million. 1 Since 19^6,
there have been several proposals to raise this amount to :;'5,
$10, and even $20 million. Tvro main, reasons have been rrlvanced
in favor of these proposals: (1) small businesses would be
Renegotiation Board, Renegotiation Act of 19 51 as




exempted to a greater degree than they are now, thus promoting
more subcontracting by prime contractors; and (2) there has
been a general rise in the price level since the last increase
in the "floor." The Board has consistently opposed raising
the "floor" for the reason that a substantial number of their
excessive profits determinations have been against contractors
reporting renegotiable sales between $1 and $5 million. To
raise the "floor" would automatically exclude a substantial
2portion of the Board's business. Another reason that the Board
has given for opposing any increases in the "floor" is that
small business, merely because it is small, should not
be relieved from the obligation it would otherwise have
to refund profits from defense contracts which are
excessive and as such contrary to national policy.
3
There have also been a number of proposals to lower the
"floor" to $500,000 or to the Vny^m War level of |25O,0O0.
Even though the number of filings would increase at the reduced
level, the Board has maintained the position that the "floor"
should remain at $1 million because that is what the admini-
stration desires.
For further amplification of these reasons, see the.
following: House, Report on Renegotiation, H. Doc. Mo. 322,
pp . 59-60; House, tensi on_jgf_ Ren r. , :; o t i at j on Act, H eari n g_s
,
1968, pp. 6, 10-11, 105, and Hearings/ 1959, pp. 128-2y;
'Weston, Procuri it and Profit Rei oti; I : on, p. 167.
2x,
p. 10.




Chairman Hartwig estimated that with a "floor" of
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Increase or Decrease the Allowable Exemptions
The exemptions referred to are not those pertaining to
standard commercial articles end services (discussed in Chapter
III), but rather to those having to do with the different types
of contracts. Industry has urged exemptions for incentive,
redeterminable, and competitively bidded contracts. Many feel
that the main benefit to industry in these exemptions is that
the proposals will encounter less resistance than a proposal to
repeal renegotiation in its entirety. In other words, industry
has adopted a strategy of attacking renegotiation piecemeal
1from within the broad confines of the law itself.* The main
argument for enacting the contract exemptions is that the three
types of contracts are already so closely supervised that there
is no need for the Board to take ;them into account after their
2
completion.
Bills to provide an exemption for competitively bidded
contracts were introduced by Representative Abraham J. Multer
in 1958 and again in 196? (H.R. 13561 and H.R. 3100, respec-
tively). Since the bills were practically identical, the Board
submitted as its 1968 position, the letter that it had sub-
mitted on August 1, 1958 in opposition to H.R. 13561, The
following excerpt pertains to the competitively bidded contract:
The proposed, exemption is based on the premise that
formal advertising and competitive bidding in accordance
with the requirements of the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 19 ;-!7 will always prevent excessive profits. This
premise, in the opinion of the Board, is not sound. It




has been the experience of the Board, and we believe of
the Department of Defense, that many of the uncertainties
which justify renegotiation may in fact prevail in areas
in which it is appropriate, to use formal advertising and
competitive bidding procedures. This is substantiated
by the fact that in a substantial number of cases coming
before it the Board has found excessive profits in con-
tracts let as a result of competitive bidding. The
principal cause of such profits is that a bidder, although
striving to bid the lowest possible price, must base his
bid upon an estimate of costs to be incurred plus some
provision for contingencies. It is obvious that his
estimate may exceed the costs actually thereafter incurred,
and it is equally obvious that the contingencies which
bidders provide for will often never occur. The fact
that there are three or more bidders does not change
these inherent reasons why there may be excessive profits
in competitively bid contracts.
^
Representative of the bills introduced to exempt incen-
tive contracts is one that was introduced by Senator Leverett
Saltonstall (S. 500) in 1959. The Senator pointed out that the
incentive contract, as well as fixed-price and competitively
bid contracts, were types that were designed to produce prices
which did not include payments to the contractor of excessive
profits. In other words, if these contracts were executed and
2
audited properly, there would be no need for renegotiation.
The Board's position on exempting incentive contracts
has been previously stated. Basically it was that an incentive
contract is no better than the target cost upon which the
operation of its incentive formula depends, and. for this reason
incentive contracts should not be exempt from renegotiation.
1
'House, Extension of Renegotiation Act, hearings. I96C,
p. 10.
2
'Horace H. Hopkins, "Possible Modifications in the









The redeterminable type of contract has in its original
terms a provision whereby the price can be adjusted up or down
after a certain amount of cost experience has been obtained.
Proponents of this exemption claim that excessive profits are
less likely to occur in such contracts that have been, and will
be, subject to practically constant review by the contracting
activities.
Opponents of this exemption basically hold the view of
former chairman Coggeshall that price revision provisions can
only be written into a contract if the contractor agrees to
them and that if a contractor knew he would not get renegotiated
should he refuse to accept such price revisions, he would
2probably be less than cooperative.
Move the Renegotiation Process to
the Defense Department
There have been several proposals through the years to
blish the Renegotiation Board and transfer its functions back
to the Department of Defense where an organization similar to
the Military Renegotiation Policy and Review Board of 19^8
would again be created. The very existence of the various pro-
posals to move the Board gives rise to the question of why was
the Board created in the first place. The hearings conducted
in 1951 provide an answer: "Only the creation of a separate
agency will insure the objective business judgment and the
1House, Ext en si on of Renegotiati on Act
, Hearin g s , 1 96 8
,
P. 7.
2Coggeshall, "Basic Principles of Renegotiation," p. 52
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uniformity of decision so essential to the fair and equitable
administration of renegotiation." The implication of this
reason is that the Koiiegotiation Board was created to review the
actions of procurement officials. Although this may be an
indirect purpose of the Board, it is by no means the most impor-
tant. The Board directs its actions against contractors who
realize excessive profits—not against the agencies that made
the contracts with the suppliers. The Board leaves to the
General Accounting Office the task of overseeing the contracting
2policies of uhe various procurement agencies.
Marcus sums up the prevalent feeling concerning the
transfer of renegotiation to another department:
Renegotiation would not necessarily be improved by
transferring it back to the Department of Defense which
administered the Renegoti atj on Act of 19^8 or to all the
interested contracting departments in the manner of the
wartime renegotiation statutes. It is probable that
the effect of such a move, even if acceptable to the
departments concerned, would not change present proce-
dures very much. The inevitable professionalization of
renegotiation that has already been noted makes it
unlikely that its policies would be greatly affected by
the contracting agencies even if renegotiation were
made a responsibility of those agencies.
3
Repeal the Renegotiation Act
This particular proposal and its opposite (make renego-
tiation permanent) have caused perhaps the most fundamental
"U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means,
Renegotiation Act of 1951, H. Report No. 7, 82d Cong., 1st sess.,
1951, P. 3.
2
House, Extension of Ren e
g
otiation Act
, Hearing s , 1 9 6 8
,
pp. 61-62.
•'Marcus, "Appropriate Public Policy," pp. 19/1-95.
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conflict of the entire renegotiation controversy. Advocates of
repeal base their arguments on the "inescapable arbitrariness of
renegotiation" and the existence of "newly developed procurement
techniques.
"
The procurement techniques normally referred to are cm-
bodied in the 1962 Truth-in-Negotiatlons Act (Public Law 87-653)
which was passed partly because of the recommendations of the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees. These two Commit- \
tees were conducting a study of Department of Defense procure-
ment procedures at the same time that the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation was conducting its study of renegotia-
. . 2tion.
Public Law 87-653 requires that prime contractors or
subcontractors submit cost or pricing data and certify in
writing as to the accuracy of the data in any contracts for over
$100,000.-* The law also provided for the contract price to "be
adjusted to exclude any amounts by which it was increased due
to the submission of cost or pricing data which was inaccurate,
incomplete or noncurrent . " To check on the accuracy of the
data, a contracting officer may request audits of contracts
which he believes may be suspect. As a further precaution, the
1Coggeshall, "Basic Principles of Renegotiation," p. 50.
2
"House, Re port on Renegot' i i, H. Doc. No. 322, p. x.
3
^General Accounting Office, "Need for Improving Admini-
stration of the Cost or Pricing Data Requirements of Public Law
87-653 in the Award of Prime Contracts and Subcontracts in the
Department of Defense," (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting
Office, January, 1967), p. 3-





Department of Defense conducts a program of reviews and audits
to insure that the data are accurate.
Critics of renegotiation rely on the Truth Act as the
main basis for their position of repealing renegotiation. The
standard reasoning put forth is that how could there possibly
be any excessive profits when each contract that is made with
Defense is scrutinized closely to insure that the profit made
is reasonable? Representative Gubser said about the Truth Act
i
in 1968 that
It is being strengthened every day. The Truth-in-
Kegotiations Act is a relatively new tool which renders
the renegotiation process even more obsolete. Further-
more, as recommended by our committee, the Department
of Defense is continuing to sharpen the effectiveness
of the tool.
. . . f/fhe Act} accomplishes anything which
the Renegotiation Board can possibly claim as a reason
for its existence.^'
Wj t^1 9 !l ] the provj °^ ons r>^ the Truth— j v->--^T '~> ~ot"^ ati ons
Act and the laudatory testimony thereto, it would seem that
procurement procedures in the Department of Defense have pro-
gressed to the point where the Renegotiation Board is no
longer needed.
Apparently, such is not the case. There are many indi-
cations that the Truth Act is not working effectively. One
unfavorable 3:,eport is from the General Accounting Office, which
in 1967 found that 102 out of 1*1-1 prime contracts had cost and
pricing data which was inadequate or not submitted in writing.
In some cases the contractor certified that data was complete,
but the agency involved had no record of what the data was J In
other cases, contractors were exempted from submitting data by
1Ibid.
,
p. 43. Ibid . , p. 73-
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the contracting officer because, in the officer's opinion, the
gathering and furnishing of the data would impose too much of a.
workload on the contractor.
Another critic of the Truth Act has been Representative
Charles A. Vanik (Ohio):
Some would argue that the Board does not need to be
strengthened because of the Truth-in-Negotiation Act,
which was passed in 1962. It has become clear, however,
that this Act is not succeeding in its purpose. It took
the Department of Defense five years to implement the
audit provisions of the Truth Act. Nor are the proce-
dures set up under the Truth Act administered by an
independent agency like the Renegotiation Board; rather,
they are administered by officials whose impartiality
can be questioned. . . . Just this March 8th, the Hardy
Subcommittee released a report on its review of defense
procurement procedures, policies, and practices with
special emphasis on truth in negotiations. The report
made a number of recommendations urging the Defense
Department to tighten up its negotiation transactions,
which, to date, have been unsatisfactory .
^
Perhaps the most aprPrressive proponent of roho r*otiat3 on
outside of the government has been Sanford Watzman of the
Cleveland Plain Dealer. He wrote a series of articles in 1966-
I967 which took to task the Department of Defense for its
failure to use the Truth Act. Subsequently, Watzman joined
forces with Representative Gonzalez in marshalling support for
3the Board.
Some opponents of renegotiation have admitted that while
procurement procedures were lacking in the Defense Department,
General Accounting Office, "Pricing Data Require-
ments," pp. 10-15.
2





, pp. 119-175 for reproductions of Gonzalez'
and Watzman 1 s speeches and articles concerning renegotiation.
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renegotiation was not the answer. Representative Thomas B.
Curtis made the following points in the hearings in 1968:
The issue, as I see it, . . . is how to best ride
herd on these contracts. Is it, as I would argue, to
continue trying to develop a better procurement policy
within the Defense Department, through laws and through
techniques, or to use the device of an independent
board such as the Renegotiation Board to get at this?
The Renegotiation Board in my judgment served the pur-
pose when they had to follow crash procurement practices
because you didn't have time to do it in an orderly way.
But hopefully, and I emphasize "hopefully," we have
gotten to the point where we don't have to use crash
procurement practices. The procurement policies we
presently follow on paper, if the laws are endorsed,
will get at the very thing we are talking about.
Nov;, our hearings last year revealed a woeful lack
of corciDliance by the military establishment with the
truth in procurement laws and the testimony of the
General Accounting Office revealed this.
Nov:, the Renegotiation Board certainly contributed
nothing in doing all this. Nor would it catch any of
this because the Renegotiation Board in its testimony
reveals that it does no auditing.
1
The argument for making the Renegotiation Board perma-
nent is best stated by the Chairman in a letter to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, dated February 23, 19&8:
'The continuation of statutory renegotiation for an
indefinite period is considered essential in the national
interest . . . because there is no foreseeable end to the
•conditions which make it necessary.
Even if the Vietnam conf].ict were to end in the near
future, the end of international tensions is not in sight.
Hence there will be a continuing demand for new and
increasingly complex aircraft, missiles, space vehicles
and other specialized, items; and huge purchases will con-
tinue to be made under conditions similar to those now
prevailing. Market-tested prices do not and cannot exist
for costly, novel, and complex military and space products.
For this reason prices must be negotiated, often with sole
source contractors. Such negotiated prices- are necessar-
ily based upon uncertain cost estimates because reliable
cost experience is not available. Improved, purchasing
techniques cannot alter these basic characteristics of




Furthermore, although awards will continue to be
made on a contract-by-contract basis, the profitability
of the contracts cannot be known until the profits
resulting from the contractor's performance of all his
contracts are recorded for- his fiscal year. Renegotia-
tion provides an after-the-fact review of such profits.
Thus it affords the only means for assuring that the
profit outcome of procurement is reasonable. ^
Pro and Con Positions
This section will be devoted to a summarization, by
means of a sampling of pertinent statements, of the basic posi
tions for and against renegotiation. Viewpoints represented
are those of Members of Congress, Board representatives, busi-
ness and industry groups, and private citizens. First to be
presented will be the opposition viewpoint.
(Testimony of Charles W. Stewart, President of Allied
and Machinery Products Institute)
:
We feel that the Congress should go awfully slow in
reenacting what I believe is the fifth extension of the
1951 Act at a time when we have none of the conditions
which are characteristic, economicwise, or from the
standpoint of procurement, of all-out war efforts. . . .
The justification for renegotiation under present cir-
cumstances is placed before you in a wholly perfunctory
manner and there is nothing new about the current justi-
fication versus the presentation made to you last year.
2
If a Board is so omniscient that it can determine
what is an excessive profit, why can't it also determine
what is an inadequate profit and offset inadequate pro-
fits against so-called excessive profits? . . . Let us
put renegotiation in perspective. I have said that
"old Government agencies never die and they make every
effort to avoid fading away."
In my judgment, this is precisely the posture of the









problem area to which it was addressed no longer exists.
We shouldn't use an archaic, obsolete tool designed for
different conditions and different circumstances to
solve the problem of today -when that too is wholly
inappropriate and when it is also characterized by this
extraordinary type of arbitrary or capricious judgment
which is implicit in the renegotiation process. *
(Statement of the Chamber of Commerce):
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States is
firmly opposed to any extension of the Renegotiation Act.
Based upon studies made by its Taxation and National
Defense Committees, the chamber believes that:
1. Renegotiation is an arbitrary process and is
neither necessary nor desirable in our present free
enterprise economy;
2. It places a premium on inefficiency and unsound
procurement administration because the military services
have adequate procurement techniques for controlling
profits at all contracting levels;
3. It undermines the basic philosophy of our free,
competitive enterprise system; and
^J-. Proposed amendments offer no solution to the «
basic problems inherent in the renegotiation process.
(Testimony of Charles S. Gubser, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California)
:
Mr. Chairman, I believe I have shown that the renego-
tiation process results in a net loss to the taxpayer,
that it contrad established procurement policy, that
it is injuriou. /'defense procurement and restricts the
talent and ing "•:/ of American industry which is avail-
able to the na : :l defense, and lastly, that the act
is unnecessary.
I urge you to let this useless and obsolete act die
at the end of its authorized period. In no event should
it be made permanent and in no event should its juris-
diction and authority be increased.
3
(Telegram from David Packard, Chairman, Hewlet-Packard
Company, presently Deputy Secretary of Defense):
iiou s e , Extension of Renegotiati on Act, Hearings , 1968,
P. 9 ;i.
2





-ri ou s e
,
Exten si on of Renegotiati on Act, Hearing s





the continued expansion of Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulations to provide for competitive procure-
ment of commercial items and the requirements of the
Truth in Negotiations Act in negotiated procurements
minimizes the need for continuation of the renegotiation
ac t . 1




Our main point . . . is . . . that the Renegotiation
Board is trying to perpetuate itself by inferring that
they are checking for excess profits on negotiated con-
tracts when in fact they are extending their authority
beyond what we believe to be the intent of Congress.
2
(Statement of Thomas 3. Curtis, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Missouri):
I don't think the Board has done much. ... I will
be very frank. I think there is a very much better way
to handle this operation. ... If you have done nothing,
I know what I would do with your Board. I would get rid
of all five of you. It is apparent to me why this Board
has been ineffectual as it has been over a period of
years. You can't even give us data that relates to the
increased amount of Government procurement that is going
on . . . and the Board is unaware of the discrepancies
that exist in compliance with the Truth in Negotiations
Act which Congress passed with the price adjustment fea-
tures. 3
The proponent view is exemplified by the following
excerpts.
(Testimony of Carl Vinson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Georgia):
The dollars that arc recovered by the process of re-
negotiation are relatively small compared to the dollars
that would otherwise be needlessly expended through over-













The Renegotiation Act is something like a vaccine;
its value is not so much in the cases it cures as it is
in the cases that it prevents from becoming infected.
Renegotiation, therefore, induces voluntary price reduc-
tion, to avoid statutory renegotiation..
Renegotiation does no more than prevent or eliminate
profits that are clearly excessive and unreasonable on
an over-all basis~-profits that it would be clearly
unconscionable for a contractor to retain from his
dealings with his Government in circumstances which pre-
cluded proper initial pricing.
1
(Statement o£ Former Chairman Thomas Coggcshall)
:
In all the years that this controversial subject has
enlivened the American scene, there has been unanimous
agreement on one proposition: excessive profits on
defense business have no place in our national life.
Admittedly it is difficult to define and determine
excessive profits, but I submit that the renegotiation
law, with its all-encompassing judgment and flexibility,
is the best and fairest method this country has yet been
able to devise to accomplish this delicate task.
2
(Testimony of Henry B. Gonzalez, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Texas)
:
The judgment of men in applying the renegotiation laws
obviously works exceptionally well. It does not make
sense to me to argue that simply because the judgment of
men is involved the Renegotiation Act should not be made
permanent.
,
I believe that enactment of my bill would make an
important contribution toward limiting profiteering. . . .
The great need for opening all possible avenues to renego-
tiation lies in the fact that the Board is the sole and
single agency which has been consistently effective in
preventing war profiteering. In comparison, the history
of DOD compliance with the Truth in Negotiations Act
demonstrates it cannot be expected to police its own
contracts.
3
(Letter from R. W. Landies, TRW, Inc.):
1959, P.
2
Rouse, Exten sion of the Renegotiation Act, Hearings-.
p. 187.
Coggeshall, "Basic Principles of Renegotiation," p. 58,
^house ,
.




If there ever was a need for legislation to benefit
the tax payer, it is the need for sueh legislation to
continue the Renegotiation Board function and to grant
it more power than it has at the present time. It is
indeed a sad commentary that such a Board is necessary,
but the fact remains that it is. . . .
If the politicians and the businessmen are unable to
curb their excessive draining of our natural economic
resources, then certainly we must have a control group
to insure that it is kept to an absolute minimum. I am
strongly in favor of supporting all legislation that will
further the work of the Renegotiation Board. 1
(Statement of Charles A. Vanik, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Ohio)
:
The Renegotiation Board is unique in that it is the
only independent agency designed to recapture excessive
profits from defense, space, and other government con-
tractors. . . .
The Renegotiation Board does not exist at the
sufferance of the defense contractor; it exists at the
demand of indignant taxpayers. And with the escalation
of the Vietnam conflict, the demand for the Board is
greater than ever. ... I am hopeful that the Committee
and Congress will, at this time, when so many young
Ainer3 cans are giving their lives for their country,
strengthen the Board so that a few do not make "war
profit killings" at the expense of the whole Nation. 2
(From the Cleveland, Ohio Plain Dealer, January 10,
1968):
The federal government's Renegotiation Board, which
has saved hundreds of millions of dollars for taxpayers,
is confronted with a fight for its life. It must be
saved. Not only that, it should be given new strength.
Instead of ignoring this life or death matter as it has
to date, Congress should be giving it close attention.
Powerful forces are at work to let the useful inde-
pendent agency die a quiet death or allow it to survive
only in a weakened condition.
Now is the time for responsible members of Congress
to exert a powerful countervailing force on behalf of
the Board and the taxpayers for whom it saves money.
3












It can be fairly concluded that renegotiation has
proved itself an effective method of eliminating profits
on defense and space contracts, an effective inducement
to voluntary refunds and price reductions, and an effec-
tive deterrent against overpricing in the first
instance. . . .
The administration proposes that the Renegotiation
Act be extended "Without termination date. In making this
recommendation, we submit that there is no foreseeable -,
end to the conditions which make renegotiation necessary.
Summary
During the tenure of renegotiation, there have been
several proposals to modify the process. Three of the most
common have been concerned with the statutory "floor," the
exemption of certain types of contracts, and the relocation of
the process of renegotiation back to the Defense Department,
The last change (to $1 million) to the statutory
"floor" was made in 1956. Reasons advanced for increasing the
M^Tn^rll V V > -, » r , A r - -. Ji— 1 m-fM + o - - , - - r> V- i T r3 r - r. - *
the small business community and the fact that prices have
risen since the occasion of the last change. The Board and the
administration have successfully opposed any raise as well as
any increase in the "floor."
The exempting of incentive, price-redetermlnabD.e , and
competitively bidded contracts has been proposed by industry as
a way of attacking and weakening the power of the Board. The
main argument offered is that with careful use of these con-
tracts, there is no need for them to be included in a contrac-
tor's over-all renegotiable business. The proposals have not






V/ith respect to the proposal to remove renegotiation
back to the Defense Department, the general consensus appears
to be that nothing beneficial would be gained by the transfer.
In addition to changing renegotiation, there have been
proposals to repeal or make it permanent. Advocates of repeal
rely on the operation of the Truth in Kegotiations Act as a
replacement for renegotiation. There are several indications
that the Truth Act is not working, however.
Members of Congress and the Renegotiation Board have
submitted that renegotiation should become permanent, for the
main reason that there is no foreseeable end to the conditions
which make it necessary. To date, Congress has not been con-
vinced that renegotiation should be either repealed or made
permanent but instead has continued its policy of renewal
every two to three years.
The chapter concluded with a brief sampling of the




The following are the major conclusions reached by the
author:
1. Although conceived as a temporary measure during
World War II, renegotiation has become, in the twenty-seven
years since its inception, essentially a permanent part of
national defense procurement policy.
2. However, regardless of the experience gained con-
cerning the operations of renegotiation during this period, a
better definition of excessive profits and the statutory
factors concerned therewith is needed in order that more specif-
ic guidelines are made available to the contractors and Board
officials alike. This would undoubtedly require changes in the
law, but hopefully the benefits attributable to these changes
would outweigh the disadvantages.
3. There is need also for an up-to-date review of the
renegotiation process as well as a concurrent, complete study
of defense procurement techniques and levels of defense con-
tractor profits. The main arguments for and against renegotia-
tion seem to revolve around the fact' that the Defense
Department is not doing as effective a job in its procurement
process as it should be doing. There is a definite need for a





a) What are the actual profits and costs of the
contractors?
b) What actual cost is there to the contractors and
the government as a result of the renegotiation process?
c) Does the threat of renegotiation cause closer
initial pricing of contracts as claimed by proponents of the
Board?
d) Should the renegotiation process remain non-
adversary or should it become more like a court of law?
e) Have the objectives of renegotiation changed over
the years, and does the current process meet these objectives?
f
)
Can the purposes of renegotiation be met by pro-
curement techniques presently available?
^-. The periodic review by Congress of the renegotiation
process is important to prevent the unwise and discriminatory
exercise of power by renegotiation officials. No other agency
of the federal government (save the Congress through its taxing
power) has the power to take away money from the private sector
of the economy in the way that the Board does. The abolition
of war profiteering is important, but it is equally important
that due process be carried out and that the rights of all
parties to renegotiation be protected.
5. Although the complaints against renegotiation have
been many, the fact remains that only k per cent of the deter-
minations of the Board have been appealed by the contractors to
the Tax Court. It can be concluded from this that the contrac-
tors either have been willing in general to regard the Board's
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determinations as "reasonable" or, if not that, then they have
been reluctant to undergo further litigation in the Tax Court
due to the cost and time involved, or to the apparent futility
of the process.
6. The claims of opponents of renegotiation that the
process results in a loss to the taxpayer should be regarded
with skepticism as should be the claims of proponents that
renegotiation has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars
refunded to the U.S. Treasury. The accounting and reporting
systems in the government and private industry are not compat-
ible as yet and thus neither side can state unequivocally v.That
the results of renegotiation are.
7. The existence of renegotiation operates in some
indeterminate measure as a deterrent to increased profiteering
by contractors. While this deterrent effect may not be as
important a justification for renegotiation as t?ie Boards pro-
ponents have indicated, neither can it be discounted entirely,
in accordance with the wish of industry opponents. It is the
author's view that contractors are probably influenced by the
presence of the renegotiation statutes in much the same way as
they are influenced by the tax lairs. Although disobedience of
either set of laws may lead to greater short-run profits, the
long-run effect of such disobedience will tend toward reducing
the company's public reputation—an effect that 'most companies
engaged in' the highly competitive economy of today vjould rather
not be subject to.
8. Renegotiation, like taxes, will probably never be
favorably looked upon by everyone. Thus, it is necessary for
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the public to rely upon the wisdom and judgment of the elected
officials to insure that the points of view of private industry,
the government, and the general public are taken into account;
in any determination as to the continued need for renegotiation.
However, these officials cannot merely passively listen to the
persuasive, and sometimes explosive, arguments of the opposing
sides. They must instead search for unbiased facts which will
allow a conscientious and fair application of the principles of
i
government to the question of renegotiation.

APPENDIX A




Letter of Preliminary Inquiry
litiemen:
The attached forms and instructions are transmitted to you so that you may comply with the
.fegotiation Act. This material is designed to help you prepare a report under the Act or deter-
ie that you are not required to file such a report.
To avoid possible further inquiry, the Board would appreciate being advised if you determine
i, you are not required to file a report, and the reason therefor.
The enclosed material should be read carefully. If a filing is to be made, the appropriate
tiched form should be completed and filed with the Board. In order to cooperate with you in
e)ing your work to a minimum, the Board will accept a photocopy of your work papers wherever
uoorting data are required by the form.
k This Letter of PreJim^nriry Inquiry dc?s not ccnctliute the Commencement of renegotiation
r.eedings with your company.
The instructions are not a substitute for the Board's regulations, but should suffice in many
li:s to enable a contractor to take appropriate action under the Act. The Renegotiation Board
filiations (together with Renegotiation Rulings and Bulletins) may be obtained from the Super-
Jtident of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, at a sub-
cption price of $6.50. The Renegotiation Board cannot comply with requests for copies of
fee regulations.
All inquiries or correspondence with respect to these forms and instructions shoud be










ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THE FORMS AND THIS BOOKLET
May bo obtained in person or by communicating with:
The Renegotiation Board
1910 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20446
Western Regional Renegotiation Board
300 N. Los Angeles Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
























75 Forsyth St., N.W.
U.S. Customhouse
908 S. 20th St.





219 S. Dearborn St.
550 Main St.
E. 6th St. & Superior Ave.
1114 Commerce St.
20th & Stout Sts.
509 Grand Ave.
445 Federal Bldg.




























167 N. Main St.
51 S. W. First Ave.
238 W. Wisconsin Ave.




230 N. First Ave.
1000 Liberty Ave.
520 S.W. Morrison St.
300 Booth St.
400 N. Eighth St.
1520 Market St.
125 S. State St.






jope of renegotiation: Renegotiation is the process of determining what part, if any, of the profits realized
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contra«or " deludes subcontractor, except when the context indi-





The Renegotiation Board Regulations are cited as "RBR" followed by theps. or section number. lu ,uvau "3 un
P<:son: As used herein, the term "person" includes an individual, firm association Mm.™hh, „ Aftnlzed group of persons whether or no, incorporated, including joint ventures '^^^ ^ «*
gmio^control: In determining whether a filing is required for a fiscal year, the renegotiable sales of acoractor are aggregated with those of all other persons under control of or controll! 7or u dor t
corol with such contractor. For further explanation, see page 7.
"trol ing or n ei common
g?oii^ted_rene£otIadon: Contractors under control of or controlling or under common control with«r persons, and desiring to be renegotiated on a consolidated basis should consult RRK ZmI
»i particular reference to the letter form of request to be submitted. ^t'




COrreSP°"denCe a "d «*»• "lis, reference££%£
FILING REQUIREMENTS
i^LS^ (a) A filing must be made by every contractor or subcontractor (other than subcontractorsn as brokers or manufacturers- agents) having receipts or accruals which exceed $1 mill on In a fiscal
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(c) In computing whether the applicable amount stated above is exceeded, the renegotiable business of
arent, subsidiary and commonly controlled contractors must be aggregated (sec Common Control, page 7).
(d) If the fiscal year of the contractor or subcontractor is less than 12 months, the applicable statutory
linimum of $1 million or $25,000, as the case may be, is prorated accordingly. For example, if the fiscal
lear of a contractor (other than a broker or manufacturer's agent) covers a nine-month period, the "floor"
5 9/12 of $1,000,000, or $750,000.
(e) The Act prescribes penalties for willful noncompliance.
^ho may file : If re "gotiable receipts or accruals computed as above for a fiscal year do not exceed the
pplicable statutory "floor", the contractor may file but is not required to do so. The choice is his. If a
iling is made in good faith and the Board does not commence renegotiation within one year thereafter, the
ontractor achieves the advantage that his responsibilities under the Act have been fully discharged for
he period covered by such filing.
Mat to file; (a) A single copy of the Standard Form of Contractor's Report, marked RB Form 1, must be
tied by tl . contractors and subcontractors whose renegotiable receipts or accruals exceed the statutory
linimum.
(b) A single copy of the Statement of Non- Applicability, marked RB Form 90, is to be used by those
ontractors and subcontractors having renegotiable receipts or accruals less than the statutory minimum,
mo elect to file.
Jote: The appropriate form included in this booklet should be used.
Vho may sig n : The Standard Form of Contractor's Report and the Statement of Non-Applicability may be
igned by an individual duly authorized to do so. Documentary evidence of such authority, such as a corporate
esolution or a power of attorney, must be submitted unless the individual signing is a corporate officer, a
lartner or a joint venturer, or a sole proprietor.
Vhen to file ; The Standard Form of Contractor's Report must be filed on or before the first day of the fifth
nonth following the close of the contractor's fiscal year. For example, if a contractor's fiscal year ends on
)ecember 31, the report must be filed on or before May 1 of the following year.
Extensions of time for filing will be granted for good cause upon written request of the contractor. Such
>
-equests should be made prior to the due date for the filing. When the time to file the Federal income tax
!-
eturn has been extended, the renegotiation filing need not be made until 15 days after the extended '
late of the tax return, provided a copy of the document evidencing the extension of time is filed with the
3oard on or before the original due date for the renegotiation filing. If an additional extension of time is
granted by the Internal Revenue Service, the filing need not be made until 15 days after the extended date
;et by Internal Revenue, provided a copy of the document evidencing such extension is filed with the Board
m or before the last due date for the renegotiation filing.
The renegotiation filing should not be made prior to filing your Federal income tax return.
Amere to file ; Filings should be made with The Renegotiation Board, Washington, D.C. 20446.
vJote ; Please refer to your prior year's filing, if one was made. If the Board requested additional informa-
ion concerning such filing in order to make it acceptable, be sure that like information applicable to your
:urrent filing is included.
!
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPi
THE STANDARD FORM OF CONTRACTOR'S REPORT
The following instructions are arranged to conform with the sequence of sections in the Standard Form of
Infractor s Report (RB Form 1). If any space provided on RB Form 1 is inadequate, additional sheetshilarly numbered and captioned should be used. The Form provided is to be considered as a guide and
Hild be expanded to the degree necessary to portray your business adequately. Wherever supporting data
a? required, the Board will accept a photocopy of your work papers.
I Enter your LPI number in the space provided on RB Form' 1. Enter your taxable year in the spacedugnated "fiscal year ended" in the heading of the report.
Contractors having renegotiable business, who wish to be considered as a group for renegotiation, may
| on a consolidated basis for such group under certain conditions (see RBR Fart 1464). The documents
smutted should include: (1) the Standard Form of Contractor's Report prepared on a consolidated basis,
wh a consohoated balance sheet for this fiscal year (and for the preceding fiscal year unless previously
finished) and a consolidated income account; (2) separate complete RB Form 1 for each group member
W;h individual financial statements; (3) a cor^oJidating_ income statement showing separately renegotiable
Bj non-rencgotiable business of each group member in the detail specified in Section I of RB Form 1: and('the appropriate letter form of request.
|
SECTION I
Income Statement for Renegotiation
:
you are engaged in more than one type of rene-
ebsiness, manufacturing products of widely diver-
itM, or if you operate on a divisional basis, sched-
toWig operating results by principal products or
j;ould be submitted to supplement the information
»
I 6 should be completed by using book figures ex-
isted figures should be used to reflect changes
;special accounting agreements or contract price
returnsjj-.E S (NE T); "Net" means less discount
to allowances.
JJ.. Prime Contracts ; Enter in appropriate col-
|jnegotiable sales (net) under prime contracts
pu:hasc orders with agencies named in the Act,
th Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy'
thiAir Force, the Maritime Administration, the
laviariiime Board, the General Services Adminis-
»,he National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tli Atomic Energy Commission, and (since July 1,
Itl Federal Aviation Agency.
!" ( B ) - Enter total sales under firm fixed-price
Ifcicts only. Do not include in this column sales
k any contract containing price adjustment pro-
mts of any kind.
^HJCJ - Enter total billings and accruals, in-
i'-i fees, under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee (CPFF)
f-cts. Do not include in this column sales under
lus-incLiitive-fee (CPIF) contracts.
Bn (D) - Enter total sales under all other types of
Ht-'cts, including fixed-price incentive (FPI) and
*lus-incentive-fce (CPIF) contracts. Sales under
rllconci-acts are billings and accruals, including
-s.lf multiple incentives are involved, attach a
Bent describing the incentive provisions in the
W contracts and the method of recording accruals.
Ao include in this column sales under contracts
Wing for escalation, redetermination or other
price revision, time and material contracts, facilities
contracts, termination settlements, etc.
If sales under more than one type of contract are
included, furnish a supplemental schedule showing
sales of each type with related costs and expenses.
If the sales include significant amounts of price adjust-
ments, state such amounts by contract types and the
portions applicable to this fiscal year and any prior
year.
Line 1. b. Subcontracts ; Enter in appropriate columns
renegotiable sales (net) under subcontracts, including
purchase orders, etc. The instructions for prime con-
tracts apply also to the subcontract sales shown on this
line.
Line 1. c. Commissions ; Enter in Column (D) total re-
negotiable receipts or accruals under subcontracts of the
type commonly held by brokers or manufacturers' agents.
Such amounts include not only compensation based upon
a percentage of the principal's sales, but also fees,
retainers, etc. See page 8, Special Instructions for
Brokers and Manufacturers' Agents.
Line 1. d. ^Royalties, Rentals, Management Fees, etc.;
Enter in Column (D) total renegotiable receipts or
accruals of the types specified on this line. Classify
amounts included by types, attaching statement if neces-
sary.
Line 1. e. Total^ Net_Sales
: In Column (A), enter the sum
of Columns (3), (C), (D)and(E). If total net sales entered
in Column (A) are not in agreement with the total sales
shown in your income statement or audit report, furnish
a reconciliation of such difference on an attached
schedule.
Line 2. COST OF GOODS SOLD;
Lines 2. a. - 2. e .
amounts of the components comprising* the Cost of Goods
Sold.
Enter in the appropriate columns the
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un costs are used and the components of Cost of
s sj;d are not available, furnish an approximation
ich component, expressed in either dollars or per-
I Attach an' explanation of the disposition of
nor, variances, if any, and the effect thereof on
H>le and non-renegotiable Cost of Goods Sold
.).
ie mounts recorded for the various types of con-
s)uld be the costs and expenses actually paid or
rrecunder such contracts and allocated in accord-
wti your system of accounts, rather than the
ntslof costs and expenses allowed or accepted
rsiih contracts by the customer,
peel rules for the allocation of research and
lopjsnt expenses are set forth in RBR 1459.8(c).
jalj, such expenses are allocable to renegotiable
ted to the extent that they are required for, or
lenti t-"> the performance of, any renegotiable con-
1 {her research and development expenses may
ja-ijcated if incurred in basic research expected
tnej: the company as a whole or if incurred as a
ira^n to bid or negotiate for future defense busi-
.010 perform such business more efficiently.
j
SE;LING & ADVERTISING EXPENSE :
s 3a. - 3. g,: Selling expense generally is allo-
: tc renegotiable business only to the extent that
t iflatcs in major part to services performed in
inland adapting renegotiable products to the uses
reqrements of the customer; or (2) it relates to
Mienance of offices engaged in servicing rene-
nroducts; or (3) it relates to the sale of rene-
weoroducts or services which are of a type ordi-
sld or rendered by the contractor through his
alystem of distribution; or (4) it is a commission
orpayable to non-employees such as brokers,
Hirers' agents, etc. (see RBR 1459.7(a)).
admissions allocable to renegotiable business
Ed,!5,000 for any agent, submit a schedule showing
am and address of each such agent and the amount
\Mo renegotiable business.
dvftising expense generally is not allocable to
(otble business except for expenditures pertaining
!lp
,ranted, disposal of scrap or surplus materials,
:ae>rocurcrnent of scarce items. Advertising ex-
ny be allocated to subcontract business If the
ict sold are substantially similar to those sold in
ubmtractor's normal commercial business. Costs
!ib;;bing catalogues, technical pamphlets, house
Bind similar publications are allocable to rene-
blejusiness. (RBR 1459.7(b) and (c) and 1459.8(f)).
Line 7. ADJUSTMENT TO TAX BASIS :
Attach schedule detailing adjustments to Federal inc-
tax basis of figures used in Lines 1 - 6 showing the alloca-
tion of each adjustment between renegotiable and non-
renegotiable business. Explain the method used in allocating
such adjustments. In the case of corporations, these adjust-
ments arc usually the "Schedule M" type, relating to such
items as insurance premiums on the lives of corporate
officers, depreciation, research and development expense,
etc.
Line 8. TOTAL COSTS & EXPENSES ;
Enter the total costs and expenses reported on Lines 2 -
6 as adjusted on Line 7.
Line 9. OPERATING PROFIT OR (LOSS) :
Enter the difference between Line 1. e. and Line 8.
Line 10. OTHER INCOME & (DEDUCTIONS) NET, ALLO-
Gl'lERAL & ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE:
CABLE IN WHOLE OR PART TO RENEGOTIABLE
BUSINESS ;
Enter in Column (A) amount representing the difference
between non-operating income and deductions, such as
interest income, interest expense, etc., and allocate this
amount to other columns as appropriate. Attach schedule
detailing these items in the amounts shown in your Federal
income tax return, and explain method used for allocation.
Line 11. NET PROFIT FOR RENEGOTIATION BEFORE
STATE INCOM E T A X RS
;
Enter the difference between Line 9 and Line 10. If the
profit margin varies significantly between renegotiable and
non-renegotiable business under the same type of contract,
explain the reasons for such variation. In the event of losses,
explain the reasons as they relate to Columns (B), (C), and
(D).
Line 12. OTHER INCOME & (DEDUCTIONS) NET, ALLO-
CABLE WHOLLY TO NON-RENEGOTIABLE
BUSINESS ;
Enter amount representing the difference between non-
operating income and deductions, such as profit or loss on
sale of capital assets, dividends, etc., which are allocable
wholly to non-renegotiable business. Attach schedule detail-
ing these items in the amounts shown in your Federal income
tax return.
Line 13. STATE TAXES MEASURED BY INCOME;
Enter the amount of state taxes measured by income, if
applicable.
4a. - 4. d.: Enter on appropriate lines only those
nt; which are classified as general and administra-
nse under your system of accounts.
J Enter any costs or expenses not included in
2 4 under your system of accounts.
Line 14. NET INCOME PER TAX RETURN ;
Enter amount shown on Line 11, plus or minus Line 12,
minus Line 13. In the case of a corporation, this amount
ordinarily will be that shown in the Federal income tax
return before net operating loss deduction and special

jlj. If the amount differs from "Net Income Per
•tin" because of price adjustments or a special
in agreement, attach reconciling schedule and cx-
,
PL' CIAL ITEMS IN LINES 2-7 :
il. a. Research & Developmen t Expense : Enter
research and development expense included in
1-7.
I, b. Total Officers' Compensation : Enter total
• compensation included in Lines 2-7. This
amount should include salaries, bonuses, profit sharing,
etc.
Line 15. c. Approximate Subcontracting: Enter the ap-
proximate amount of subcontracting included in Cost of
Goods Sold and attach a brief statement of the nature of
the work subcontracted. This information is needed to
evaluate the character of your business. Generally, for
this purpose, subcontracting includes the purchase of
major assemblies, subassemblies, components, serv-
ices, etc., as distinguished from the purchase of raw
materials, bars, sheets, etc.
SECTION II
Segregation of Sales and
Allocation of Costs and Expenses
(a) Segregation of Sales
(See RBR Part 1456)
crie the method used in effecting your segregation
,0'tble and non-rencgotiable sales, including par-
ly e method of determining exempt sales and the
s ijereof. A mere statement that sales have been
aedin accordance with the Act or the regulations
sufciently descriptive and may result in rejection
i:ar.ard Form of Contractor's Report,
sssexempt, all amounts received or accrued under
coiracts wj.th_.the agencies named in the Act are
: ^renegotiation. These agencies are the Depart-
ftfense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,
iritie Administration, the Federal Maritime Board,
Deri Services Administration, the National Aeronau-
ftce Administration, the Atomic Energy Comrms-
fflince July 1, 1964) the Federal Aviation Agency,
airjnts received or accrued under related sub-
is re also subject to renegotiation. The term
Mi:" includes any purchase order or agreement
^materials required for the performance of a re-
blerime contract or higher-tier subcontract, in-
wee done for affiliated or related companies. The
Sab: business of subcontractors known as brokers
t'acirers' agents is derived generally from fees or
isio; for attempting to obtain or obtaining renego-
(rin contracts or subcontracts (see page 8, Special
Ixmfor Brokers and Manufacturers' Agents),
iinticts subject 'to the Act may be identified by
fcoi customers; by the presence of a clause which
fiat he contract is renegotiate; by. the presence of
tnc to a Government contract number; or by the
( a reference to a priority number or symbol
II 02 of the named agencies.
th. duty of subcontractors to request segregation
tiorfrom their customers as needed, and it is the
CBiomerc to supply it. The subcontractor is re-
K> ,ake inquiries of customers whose use of the
Is sld by the subcontractor is not known, but whose
tl subcontractor has reason to believe may be
ariegotiation. When the subcontractor's customers
Wis, he may employ a sampling technique. In
tffhe will find that his customer's renegotiable
kffords a convenient indication of the extent to
s iles to such customer are subject to renegotia-
tion, without attempting to identify the individual sales one
by one. For example, a subcontractor who delivers castings
to a prime contractor manufacturing aircraft engines may
ascertain upon inquiry that, of all that manufacturer's
engines sold during the year, incorporating these castings,
70 percent were delivered to fulfill military orders and 30
percent were delivered to the civilian market. This sub-
contractor would be justified in assuming, for purposes
of renegotiation, that 70 percent of his sales of castings
to such prime contractor in such year were renegotiable,
assuming, of course, that none of the exemptions herein-
after mentioned was applicable. No inquiry need be made
of any customer with whom the subcontractor did business
aggregating less than $2500 during the fiscal year. This
does not mean that such sales of less than $2500 are exempt.
They should he segregated between renegollable and non-
renegotiable business on a reasonable basis.
Among the exemptions in the Act are those relating to:
(1) Prime contracts and subcontracts for standard
commercial articles or services, like articles or
services, and standard commercial classes of
articles (Instruction, Section VI; RBR 1467, Sub-
part (B)).
(2) Prime contracts and subcontracts for new dur-
able productive equipment (partial mandatory
exemption) (RBR Part 1454).
(3) Construction prime contracts awarded in con-
formity with the requirements for procurement by
formal advertising set forth in section 3 of the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 (10
U.S.C. 2305).
Note: No supplements or modifications arc ex-
empt if the aggregate price of all such changes
exceeds one-third of the original contract price.
See RBR 1453.7.
(4) Prime contracts, including purchase orders,
where the aggregate amount involved does not ex-
ceed $1000 and the period of performance does not
exceed 30 days (RBR 1455.3(b)(5)).
The Board will not disapprove any method used in devel-
oping the amount of your renegotiable business if it is satis-
fied that such method, in the circumstances, affords the best
basis for a reasonably precise determination. Therefore, the
foregoing instructions are offered for assistance only; any
other method may be used if the circumstances warrant.
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(1 Alloca tion o f Cost s a n d Expenses
(See IiBRTaFn^Sg)
btjg costs between renegotiahleand non-rencgo-
,
your cost system, if adequate, should be
jdnot have an adequate cost accounting system,
ab: formulas may be used, either for individual
,
:
oups of products, or by departments, divi-
Attach a description of your cost accounting system and
the methods used in allocating to renegotiable business cost
of goods sold, selling and advertising expense, general and
administrative expense, adjustment to tax basis, and other
income and deductions. The description of your cost account-
ing system should include: a statement whether such system
is under general ledger control; an explanation of any sig-
nificant changes made during the year in allocating costs
and expenses; and a statement whether the system is job
order, process, standard cost, etc.
SECTION III
Financial Statements
;ta:ments should be submitted in the form of a
ur iblished annual report and a copy of the audit
impendent public accountants, preferably a long-
ort/f such reports have been made. If you do not
refrts, financial statements prepared from your
Bid.; submitted.
(on! statement should show gross sales, less dis-
lurfc and allowances, in accordance with trade or
company practice; cost of goods sold, with details of manu-
facturing cost, including factory burden; selling and admin-
istrative expenses; and miscellaneous items.
The balance sheet should show, in addition to the usual
classifications, the gross plant account and related reserve
for depreciation, and other major reserves separately stated,
with their purposes clearly described.
SECTION IV
Method of Accounting Employed
rep.t ii'.ict be prepared in accordance with the
tainting used for Federal income tax purposes
J year unless the Board has permitted you by
ico'.ting agreement to adopt a different method
ptteon. If you desire to use a method different
from that used for tax purposes, and you have not received
permission from the Board to use such method, prepare
this report on your tax basis, explain the effect of the pro-
posed method, and request permission to make such changr.
(RBR 1459.1(b))
SECTION V
Voluntary Refunds and Voluntary Price Reductions
be ital amounts of voluntary refunds and volun-
\ Auctions made during this fiscal year which
fide to renegotiable business and were not
required by the terms of your contracts or subcontracts. Do
not include refunds or price reductions made pursuant to
price adjustment provisions in your contracts.
SECTION VI
Exemption of Commercial Articles or Services
(See RBR Part 1467, Subpart E)
Ifen this exemption, it is necessary that you con-
ations for the applicable definitions and rules.
plicati on: Paragraph (a) relates to amounts
bcrued under any contract or subcontract for
mmercial article" (RBR 1467.24 and 1467.25).
tii.'d to apply this exemption, without application
I only with respect to articles which meet the
ion contained in the Act. It is therefore im-
i|m consult the regulations before entering any
th line.
(b) Application to Board ; Paragraph (b) relates to
amounts received or accrued under contracts or subcon-
tracts for any of the following:
1. An article which Is identical in every material respect
with a standard commercial article—I.e., a "like
article" (RBR 1467.26).
2. An article in a standard commercial class of articles
(RBR 1467.27).




i irvlcc which is reasonably comparable with a
taiard commercial service--i.e., a "like service"
RE 1467.30).
i ipse four categories are not exempt unless you
A>licaiion for Commercial Exemption with the
J uch exemption is granted. For specific instruc-
j.cming the form and filing of an Application for
rci! . Exemption, see RBR 1467.31. If you file an
for Commercial Exemption, do not file the Stand-
ard Form of Contractor's Report until the Board has acted
upon such application.
(c) Waiver of Exemption ; Any contractor or subcon-
tractor may waive this exemption, in whole or in part (RBR
1467.23). ' Paragraph (c) of Sec. VI provides for such
v/aiver.




!n explanation of any organizational changes
luscal year, such as reorganization; acquisition,
disposal or dissolution of subsidiaries; sale of controlling
stock; conversion of a partnership to corporate form, etc.
section vni
Common Control
ppljig the floor provisions of the Act to determine
yoiare required to file the Standard Form of Con-
fc Rxtrt for your fiscal year, your renegotiable sales
iiyir must be aggregated with those of all other
co rolled by you, or who are "under your control
r enmon control with you. Thus, in applying the
ere: and subsidiary corporations are considered
I'
aivell as all related persons.
l|, for the purposes of the Act, controlmaj exist
[| the ownership of more than 50 percent of the




c profits of a partnership or joint venture for
il yar under review. Such control may reside in
mi, or in a group of individuals who customarily
ire:or who by reason of their family relationship
exacted to do so. In other cases, control may
iac even though the persons having such control
th< a 50 percent interest.
In all cases, whenever any possibility of control exists,
the facts should be fully disclosed to the Board. If two or
more contractors or subcontractors are controlled by
members of the same family group or groups, a full dis-
closure of such family relationships must be made.
The following example shows how the common control
provision of the Act operates; Corporations A, B and C are
controlled, through stock ownership, by an individual D; in
a given fiscal year, after eliminating receipts or accruals
from intercompany transactions, A has $100,000 of rene-
gotiable sales, B has $875,000, and C has $50,000. Each
corporation is required to file the Standard Form of
Contractor's Report because the total renegotiable sales
of all three exceed $1 million. In addition, if the individual
D has any renegotiable business, he would also have to
make such a filing.
section m
Products Sold or Services Rendered
[1 more than one product or render more
rvice, furnish the information requested
for each principal product or service.
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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FG!! B S AilD MANUFACTURERS' AGENTS
(Sec R R Part 1490]
island manufacturers' agents who have renego-
RcJts or accruals are subcontractors under
103;)(3) of the Act. The subcontracts described
secpn are arrangements for the payment of com-
xi b a contractor to any person other than a bona
cutite officer, partner or full-time employee, under
1)83' amount payable is contingent upon the pro-
ber of a renegotiable contract or subcontract; or
t» ail' amount payable is determined with reference
ka:'ount of a renegotiable contract or subcontract;
t)ar part of the services performed or to be per-
ted insists of the soliciting, attempting to procure,
iciing a renegotiable contract or subcontract.
» a::; a broker or manufacturer's agent, you should
-^{Instructions for Preparing the Standard Form
of Contractor's Report, except that Lines 1. a., 1. b., and
1. d., Lines 2. a. - 2. e., and Line 15. a. and 15. c. of Sec. I,
and Sec. V and VI do not apply and should not be completed.
To secure the basic information you need regarding your
renegotiable commissions, you will generally find it helpful
to consult your principals.
Important:
In addition to other information requested, attach a state-
ment showing for this fiscal year;
(a) Sales volume (referable sales ), renegotiable and
non- renegotiable, on which your commissions were
based, showing separately renegotiable sales and com-
missions by major principals.
(b) Your compensation arrangement (commission
rates, retainer fees, etc.) with each major principal . If
the arrangement for renegotiable business differs from
that for non- renegotiable business, explain.
INSTRUCTIONS FOn PREPARING THE STATEijnil gf [;o:;-appucag!Lity
I
reort form is for the use of contractors whose
iabl receipts or accruals aggregate less than the
Wnnimum amount. For contractors and subcon-
\, oier than brokers and manufacturers' agents,
iim;n is $1,000,000; for brokers, manufacturers'
fathers holding subcontracts of any of the types
' Section 103(g)(3) of the Act, the minimum is
aroot required to file this report but may elec t to
fa! you so elect, all information called for in the
(st|! furnished. If such report is filed and the Board
icomence renegotiation within one year thereafter,
ipo;ibilities under the Act will be fully discharged
ril covered by such filing.
lion should not be used by any contractor who is a
' of i commonly controlled group having an aggre-
B3i than $1,000,000 or S25,000, as the case may be,
ptiile receipts or accruals, after eliminating inter-
ftnsactions; in. such a case, the Standard Form
ict-'s Report must be filed.
isuctions that follow conform with the sequence of
n the Statement of Non- Applicability (RB Form
;Tj!i 1. In the first blank space fill in the amount
HOOO unless your fiscal year is less than twelve
racths, in which event prorate this amount. For
|ta if your Federal income tax return covered a
octh period, you would insert $750,000.
ill second blank space enter the amount of your
fin>t renegotiable receipts or accruals. This figure
t include any amount shown in paragraph 7(b),
£ aount of any other exempt contract or subcon-
H>r assistance in computing such receipts or
:il see page 5.
>nh 2. Enter the amount of your nonexenrptreneT
^commissions, etc., in the appropriate space.
Such amount includes not only compensation based upon
a percentage of the principal's sales, but also fees, re-
tainers, etc.
Paragraph 3
. If you expect to receive or accrue any
further renegotiable amounts attributable to this fiscal
year, such amounts must be included in computing total
renegotiable receipts or accruals for this fiscal year.
Paragraph 4 . List name and address (city and state only)
and check appropriate box for each person, firm or
corporation under control of, controlling, or und^r
common control with you during this fiscal year. If
additional space is needed, continue on the reverse side
of the form. Sec page 7, Common Control.
Paragraph 5 . Check appropriate boxes to indicate the
method of accounting employed in filing your Federal
income tax return and in preparing this report. See page
6, Method of Accounting Employed.
Paragraph 6. Enter the amount of gross receipts or gross
sales, less returns and allowances, shown in your Fed-
eral income tax return.
Paragraph 7
. This paragraph relates to amounts re-
ceived or accrued under any contract or subcontract for
a "standard commercial article" (see RBR 1467.24 and
1467.25). You are entitled to apply this exemption, with-
out application to the Board, only with respect to articles
which meet the special definition contained in the Act. It
is therefore important that you consult the regulations
before entering any amount in this paragraph.
Paragraph 8 . Attach a full description of the method
used by you in segregating sales between renegotiable




FOR RENEGOTIATION Ih. .', ; .' Bl 1No. 101-R002
A ON BOARD
i).C. 20446

























Ccirocts S ? S
ft!ts :
isns
it Rentcls, Mgmt. Fees, etc. >. . '
.




tctlg. Exp. (Attach Schedule)




lh C ce Expense
jflig Expense (Attach Schedule)
1
Hi Selling E>:r r.'L
li Expense








o" Gen'l. & Adm. Expense
MEOKS TO TAX B ASiS(Att.Schod.)
WiS ft EXPENSES
IKI^ROFIT OR (LOSS)
MAE 6 (DEDUCTIONS) NET,'




l/IE 6 (DEDUCTIONS) NET,
• wholly to NON-RENEGO-lESS (Attach Schedule)
JS MEASURED BY INCOME
tPER TAX RETURN
IT.IS IN LINKS 2-7:
'0 Development Expense
J! rs* Compensotion
Scontrocting in Line 2e. Above
rogation of Sales and /
KATTACH A FULL DESCRIl
P Segregating sales betwee
and the amounts thereof 1
(b Allocating cost of poods
^location of Cos!















(b) Statement of surplus for tliis fiscal year.
(c) Balance sheet as of the close of this fiscal year.
:« iv.
-
Method of Accounting Employed: Cash Accrual Completed Contract
Federal income tax return
This report
Our taxable year and the period covered by this report are: The same ] different ] (If different,
attach explanation.)
V. We made |_J made no Q \ voluntary refunds and voluntary price reductions applicable to renegotiable conti
subcontracts in this fiscal year. If applicable, complete the following: Total voluntary refunds $
Total voluntary price reductions $ .
Seo VI. Exemption of Commercial Articles or Services:
(a) Answer ON LY if you have self-applied the exemption (Instructions, VI (a)):
We have self-applied the exemption in the amount of $
renegotiable sales in Section I of this report.
and have excluded such ;
(b) Ansiver ONLY if you have applied to the Board and received an exemption for this fiscal y ear (Inslnicii
The Board has granted our application for exemption in the amount of $ __ and we
eluded such amount from renegotiable sales in Section I of this report. We have not excluded any amoun
which exemption was denied.
(c) Check ONLY if you desire to waive the exemption in whole or in part (Instructions, VI (c)):
Except for any amounts shown in (a) or (b) vabove, the exemption is hereby waived \~_ J .
;3C VII. There were Q ] were no [ ] changes in the form or control of our organization during this fiscal year. (If th
any changes, attach explanation.)
SeciVIII. There were [_ were no [ ] persons under control of, or controlling, or under common control with us durir
fiscal year. (If there were, attach statement showing name and address of each such contractor, with a brie
tion of the character of its business and the nature and extent of its relationship with you, and indicating v
had renegotiable business. ) (Instruction VIII)
&( IX. Principal products sold or services
rendered during this fiscal year
Estimated Amounts State whether manufa
Renegotiable Non-Renegotiable assembling, distribut
$ $
Certification
The undersigned certifies, under the criminal penalties provided in Sec. 105(e)(1) of the Renegotiation Act of 19
ithorized to sign this report on behalf of the contractor and that the representations contained in chis report are tn.




If a partnership or proprietorship:
Date business established
Exact name of contractor (not abl icviated)
Signature of officer, partner or proprietor
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STATEMENT OF NON-APPLICABILITY






beginning. 19_ and ended I9_






pc;ons* named in paragraph 4 below) under contracts or subcontracts subject to the act, did not exceed
for this fiscal year (Insert $1,000,000 unless fiscal year is less than 12 months, in which
prate such amou:.'). Our own nonexempt renegotiable receipts or accruals in this fiscal year aggregated
;
ro :rs and m : •: ulacturers' agen ts). Our nonexempt commissions and other receipts or accruals (together with those
|»ci:ons* named in paragraph 4 below) under subcontracts described in Section 103(g)(3) °- tne Act, did not
:ii 15,000, or the prorated portion thereof, for this fiscal year. Our own nonexempt receipts or accruals from such
mtrpts aggregated $ .
ncexpect to receive or accrue any further amounts applicable to this fiscal year which would bring aggregate
wle receipts or accruals above the $1,000,000 floor or the $25,000 floor, or the prorated amount thereof.
slicing persons* and no others, controlled or were under control of or under common control with us during this
lye
- (II none, write "none"; do not insert your own name):






tde 1 income tax return
niseport
»$j;ales or gross receipts (less returns and allowances) reported for Federal income tax purposes
Accrual Completed Contract
iher: (a) The standard commercial article exemption has not been self-applied by us
or
(b) The standard commercial article exemption has been self-applied by us to
otherwise renegotiable sales in the amount of $ .
:h; full description of the methods used in segregating sales between renegotiable and non-renegotiablc.
taenn "poison" includes an individual, firm, association, partnership, and any organized group of persons whether or not
Eooratcd, including joint ventures.
Certification
uiersigned certifies, under the criminal penalties provided in Sec. 105(e)(1) of the Renegotiation Act of 1951,
is nhorized to sign this report on behalf of the contractor and that the representations contained in this report
correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
tion:




Mailing address (including Zip code)
Signature of officer, partner or proprietor Tide
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